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Abstract: Earning an income is probably the best way to avoid poverty and social exclusion, hence
the recent trend of promoting employment through in-work transfers in OECD countries. Yet, the relative
consensus on the need for ‘making work pay’ policies is muddied by a number of concerns relative to the
design of the reforms and the treatment of the family dimension. Relying on EUROMOD, a EU-15
integrated tax-beneﬁt microsimulation software, we simulate two types of in-work beneﬁts. The ﬁrst
one is means-tested on family income, in the fashion of the British Working Family Tax Credit, while
the second is a purely individualized low wage subsidy. Both reforms are built on the same cost basis
(after behavioral responses) and simulated in three European countries which experience severe poverty
traps, namely Finland, France and Germany. The potential labor supply responses to the reforms and
the subsequent redistributive impacts are assessed for each country using a structural discrete-choice
model. We compare how both reforms achieve poverty reduction and social inclusion (measured as the
number of transitions into activity). All three countries present diﬀerent initial conditions, including
institutional environment, existing tax-beneﬁt systems and distribution of incomes and wages. These
sources of heterogeneity are exploited together with diﬀerent labor supply sensitivities to explain the
cross-country diﬀerences in the impact of the reforms.
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nomial logit.
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Poverty has been reduced in many industrialized countries by the development of large-scale welfare sys-
tems which include generous social assistance schemes for the poorest. However, there is a well-known risk
that the instruments used for this purpose generate social exclusion by making work ﬁnancially unattrac-
tive, especially to less productive workers. Consequently, the recent trend in many OECD countries has
been to promote self-suﬃciency as the best way to escaping both poverty and social exclusion. At the
institutional level, to provide protection against both plagues requires ﬁnding beneﬁt schemes which not
only guarantee suﬃcient income, but also make work ﬁnancially attractive, in comparison with remaining
inactive or unemployed. To what extent and at which cost it is possible to improve existing tax-beneﬁt
systems in Europe on both accounts is the general subject of this paper.
More precisely, we shall focus on the diﬃcult issues surrounding the design of in-work beneﬁts in
Europe. Following pioneering measures introduced in the US and the UK - the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC hereafter) and the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC hereafter) respectively -, several
European countries have implemented policies aimed at ‘making work pay’. Yet, the relative consensus
on the need for this type of reforms is muddied by concerns about eﬃcient policy design, given the
framework conditions and the general objectives pursued. In particular, the treatment of the family
dimension is a crucial issue which has only been superﬁcially explored. Policies which are means-tested
on household income, such as the EITC or the WFTC, are known to be well targeted at households in
need but may also discourage the work of secondary-earners, most often women. Individualized schemes
seem to combine more unambiguous incentive eﬀects with less eﬃcient targeting. Whether redistributive
and eﬃciency objectives can be reconciled in a single policy measure is still an open question.
When comparing the eﬀects of a reform on several countries, it is important to review the initial
conditions which determine to which extent the policy can achieve its objectives. These include the
institutional framework - in particular the existing tax-beneﬁts y s t e ma n dt h ep r e s e n c eo fam i n i m u m
wage -, the distribution of wage rates and incomes in the country as well as the size and distribution of the
labor supply elasticities. Although the importance of these initial conditions has been stressed in previous
studies, they have not been suﬃciently exploited in large-scale analyses and even less so within multi-
country comparative framework.4 Pearson (2002) and Pearson and Scarpetta (2000) state that if tax rates
are already high, the phasing-out of MWP payments may raise EMTRs to unacceptably high levels. We
argue that not only income taxation but all means-tested instruments must be systematically considered.
To do so, we analyze how the distribution of EMTRs is aﬀected by the simulated reforms in each country.
The structure of wages/earnings may also determine the viability of MWP policies; for instance, a narrow
distribution of incomes may imply either a large cost of the reform or very small amounts of transfer per
household, and hence a small impact on work incentives; the number of households in the phase-out range
(where EMTRs increase) may also be large in that case.5 The present paper contributes signiﬁcantly
on these accounts and provides useful guidelines for the design of MWP policies, by addressing these
issues in a comprehensive way and by comparing the eﬀects of two reforms in three European countries
4See Pearson and Scarpetta (2000), Bertola (2000), Gradus and Julsing (2000).
5Note that the level of EMTRs is not the only aspect we focus on. In fact, we follow the bulk of the recent literature on
labor supply so that our estimation strategy captures participation decisions above all.
1- Finland, France and Germany - all experiencing inactivity traps. Using the integrated microsimulation
of European tax-beneﬁt systems (EUROMOD), we simulate a purely individualized in-work transfer and
an extended version of the WFTC. To analyze the potential eﬀects on incentives and redistribution, we
combine the microsimulation with structural models of female labor supply. The reform scenarios are
tailored to reach the same budgetary cost - after potential behavioral responses - so that both cross-
country and cross-reform comparisons are allowed.
To clarify policy analysis, we compare the reforms in the light of two clear-cut policy goals, namely
poverty reduction and social inclusion.T h e ﬁr s to b j e c t i v ea i m sa tr e d u c i n gt h es h a r eo fh o u s e h o l d s
whose income is lower than the pre-reform poverty line while the second simply aims at maximizing the
number of transitions into work after the reform. Speciﬁcally, we question which of the suggested in-work
beneﬁts succeeds best on each account and whether the incentive eﬀect of in-work transfers is signiﬁcant
in poverty reduction. More broadly, we discuss what can be achieved given each country’s social policy
agenda.
In our view, this paper contributes to the literature on cross-country tax analyses in two ways.
Firstly, national and international studies related to tax-beneﬁt systems rely too often on case-studies
with hypothetical households. Instead, large-scale conclusions require the use of microsimulation models
in order to assess precisely the overall incentive and redistributive impacts of alternative policies. Yet, few
studies conduct such comprehensive evaluation in an international perspective.6 To our knowledge, there
are even fewer cross-country studies which combine microsimulation and labor supply models. Spadaro
(2004) extends the work of Bourguignon and al. (1997) by introducing behavioral responses into the sim-
ulations under several assumptions about the size of labor supply elasticities.7 Other studies rely on more
traditional econometric estimations, like Callan, Dex, Smith and Vlasblom (1999) and Aarberge, Colom-
bino and Strøm (2000).8 While the number of national studies using behavioral microsimulation increases
dramatically, the scarcity of similar analyses in a cross-country perspective can easily be explained by
the diﬃculty to obtain comparable information for several countries. The datasets we relied upon have
been rendered homogenous and the labor supply estimations conducted with similar speciﬁcations. In
addition, the integrated microsimulation program accounts for the whole complexity of the European tax
beneﬁt systems. Such a consistent framework oﬀers a unique chance to perform cross-country analysis in
a robust and truly comparative way.
Secondly, the success of an in-work policy depends crucially on the design of the reform in relation with
the initial conditions. These include the institutional framework - in particular the existing tax-beneﬁt
system -, the distribution of wage rates and incomes in the country as well as the size and distribution
of the labor supply elasticities. Even though the importance of these conditions has been stressed in
previous studies, they have not been suﬃciently exploited in large-scale analyses and even less so within
multi-country comparative framework.9 The present paper attempts to contribute signiﬁcantly on this
6The pioneering work of Atkinson, Bourguignon and Chiappori (1988) evaluates the redistributive potential of French
and British tax-beneﬁt systems by simulating the eﬀects of imposing the French system on the British population and
vice versa. De Lathouwer (1996) simulates the eﬀect of imposing the Dutch unemployment beneﬁt scheme on Belgian
income distribution data. Bourguignon et al. (1997) use the prototype of the integrated European microsimulation model
EUROMOD to simulate common reforms on French, British and Italian data.
7Immervoll et al. (2003) follow a similar path and include the possibility to distinguish between elasticities of working
hours and elasticities of participation.
8Callan et al. estimate an homogeneous labor supply model for four European countries and simulate the diﬀerent
income tax principles applied in the respective countries (separate taxation and splitting systems). Aarberge et al. simulate
ac o m m o nﬂat rate simpliﬁcation of the tax system in Norway, Sweden and Italy.
9See Pearson and Scarpetta (2000), Bertola (2000), Gradus and Julsing (2000).
2account and provides useful guidelines for the design of MWP policies.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the recent trend in policies aimed at
‘making work pay’ in Europe and survey the academic literature on cross-country analyses of tax-beneﬁt
systems. Section 3 outlines the structure of two types of in-work transfers and details the choices made
regarding the simulations and the design of these policies, and analyses crucial initial conditions like the
wage and working hours distribution. Section 4 summarizes the strategy to estimate labor supply and
compares the estimated elasticities with the related ﬁndings in the literature for each country. Section
5 analyses the potential eﬀects of the reform on labour supply incentives and income redistribution and
suggests interpretations of the cross-country and cross-reform diﬀerences. Section 6 concludes.
2 In-work policies in Europe
‘Making Work Pay’ (MWP) policies have been suggested primarily to oﬀset the disincentive eﬀects of
generous social assistance schemes on employment. In this ﬁrst section we recall the potential importance
of inactivity traps, focusing on the three countries we examine. It is followed by a brief summary of the
recent trends in MWP policies. Finally, we survey the related literature on cross-country analysis of tax-
beneﬁt systems and argue that the present paper is among the very ﬁrst ones to address policy simulations
in a truly comparative and comprehensive way.
2.1 Social assistance and inactivity traps in Finland, France and Germany
In the three countries we examine, minimum income schemes share a common structure which generates
potential disincentive to work. Income assistancet r a n s f e r sa r ec o m p u t e da sab a s i cm i n i m u mi n c o m e
reduced by total household resources among which labor income. In terms of eﬀective marginal tax rates
(EMTRs hereafter), households on welfare are then characterized by an implicit 100% taxation of their
earnings. In addition, housing beneﬁts are sharply phased out as earnings increase10. Yet, Finland, France
and Germany present some diﬀerences with respect to relative generosity of social assistance. German
minimum income is relatively more generous than in Finland and in France. Maximum amounts for a
lone parent with two children corresponded in 1998 to 9627, 6283 and 5432 EUR in the three respective
countries. Aggregate spending varied from 1.3% of GDP in Germany to 0.6% in Finland. Notice however
that in France housing beneﬁts contribute signiﬁcantly to social assistance.
A simple way to illustrate how institutions may discourage work is to draw household budget curves.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 represent the budget constraint of an hypothetical household - a one-earner couple
with children - in France, Germany and Finland respectively. The earner is assumed to be an employee
in activity for 12 months per year. For cross-country homogeneity, we assume the same wage rate of 6
EUR in the three graphs.11 Budget curves used in this paper represent original income (gross earnings)
on the horizontal axis and disposable income on the vertical axis. It is assumed that the ﬁrst half of
the horizontal axis corresponds to a linear increase in weekly hours of work from 0 to 40 while the
second half corresponds to a linear increase in the hourly wage from 6 to 12 EUR. The graphs display
the decomposition of disposable income into the main instruments, namely income tax, social security
contributions, total family/child beneﬁts, minimum income and housing beneﬁt.
The curves show some interesting features of the concerned countries with respect to the size of child
10In France however, levels of beneﬁt are relatively higher and withdrawn at a smaller rate than in Finland and Germany.
11This corresponds in fact to the French minimum wage (there are no wage ﬂoors in the two other countries).
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Figure 2: Budget constraint for a one-earner couple with children (France)
beneﬁts or the relative importance of social security contributions (SSC hereafter) and income taxation.12
However, the crucial aspect here is the relatively ﬂat region which characterizes all three countries and
clearly illustrates the inactivity trap. The same feature can be found for all family conﬁgurations with
the exception of two-earner couples.13 The safety net is comparable in France and Finland but France
relies also on the aforementioned generous housing beneﬁts. This relatively larger contribution of housing
beneﬁt is important; indeed, as it is phased out at a much lower rate than the minimum income, the ﬂat
segment in France is shorter compared to Finland.
More generous minimum income in Germany makes this segment longer than in Finland. However,
things are slightly more complex in this country. Indeed, small amounts of labor income (70 EUR per
month) are entirely disregarded for social assistance assessment, which correspond to the small portion
of the curve displaying a 45 degree slope; additional earnings are partially disregarded (30%) up to a
maximum of 140 EUR of disregard, which corresponds to the second positively slopped portion of the
curve. Beyond, the 100% withdrawal rate of social assistance makes the budget curve ﬂat. In addition,
as long as weekly gross earnings are below 300 EUR and working time below 15 hours per week, there is
no liability to SSC. This rule does not aﬀect the budget curve - the discontinuity in SSC at 15 hours does
not impact on the curve - simply because social assistance withdrawal automatically oﬀsets all reductions
in tax and contribution rates (as income assessment is computed on net income).
12See in-depth descriptions of the tax-beneﬁt systems in Bargain and Terraz (2001) for France, Grabka (2001) for Germany
and Viitam¨ aki (2001) for Finland.
13Budget curves for other household types (single individual with or without children, two-earner couples with or without
children, etc.) are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 3: Budget constraint for a one-earner couple with children (Germany)
A common way to characterize potential work disincent i v e sc o n s i s t si nc o m p u t i n gt h ed i s t r i b u t i o no f
EMTRs in the population. EMTRs indeed measure the size of the distortions generated by the tax-beneﬁt
system, that is, the fraction which is levied from marginal additional income. This includes increased
taxes to be paid but also the partial loss of means-tested beneﬁts. Changes in EMTRs then correspond
to changes in implicit wages, that is responses in terms of working hours due to substitution eﬀects.14
In principle, EMTRs could be computed analytically as one minus the ﬁrst derivative of the budget
constraint. However, the complexity of the tax-beneﬁt system forces us to rely on a numerical approxima-
tion. It consists in increasing gross employment income of household heads (deﬁned as the main earner
in the household) by a uniform amount dy and to use microsimulation to compute the corresponding





We opted for a uniform gross income increment dy = 1500 EUR per year. Such increment corresponds
to increased working hours until a maximum of 40 hours/week and to an increase in the wage rate
thereafter15.
14In a labor market strongly constrained by institutional and demand-side rigidities, it is however very unlikely that
workers have the possibility to vary their working time freely, except maybe for some of the self-employed.
15Note also that the step of 1500 EUR is larger than what one may think of as ‘marginal’. Yet, this choice corresponds
to an additional productive eﬀort that can be seen as more realistic than an additional euro of income. It actually
represents around 5 additional hours per week for a worker paid at 6 EUR/hour (the French wage ﬂoor). Note also that
the microsimulation accounts for the speciﬁc increase in hours worked for each of those already in work. This is important
insofar as one of the reforms simulated in this paper shall depend on work duration.
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Figure 5: Distribution of average EMTRs for active and potentially active households.
6Figure 5 shows the distribution of mean EMTRs by decile. Deciles of equivalent income are computed
on the basis of the whole population, but EMTRs are averaged over active and potentially active house-
holds only (i.e. household head must be between 25 and 60 year old, neither disabled, nor in full time
education or retired).16
The U-shaped distribution we found is now typical in France and Finland where tax-beneﬁt systems
generate high EMTRs at both ends of the distribution. In the upper part, these rates are explained by
the progressiveness of the income tax schedule while they are due to the means-testing of social assistance
at the bottom; in particular, the high EMTR level in the ﬁrst decile characterizes the inactivity trap.
In France, the overall level of taxation is lower so t h a tE M T R sa r el o w e rt h a ni nF i n l a n d ,e x c e p ti nt h e
ﬁrst decile (which is hardly concerned by income taxes). The Finnish curve is fairly smooth while the
anomalies in the French curve are mainly due to thresholds in means-tested transfers to families and to
income tax rebate.
In Germany, the aforementioned disregard of labor income for social assistance assessment is very
small but suﬃcient to explain lower EMTRs for the ﬁrst decile which contains most of the inactive
households.17 In Germany and Finland, high EMTRs in lower deciles 2 to 4 are due to the means-testing
of generous transfers observed on budget curves above. This is not the case in France where housing
beneﬁts present lower withdrawal rates and assure a relatively larger part of the transfers compared to
the other countries. This feature, together with a lower level of income taxation, mainly explain the
diﬀerence with Finland and Germany.
Finally, it is important to recall that the EMTRs computed in this paper account for social security
contributions (SSC) in addition to direct taxes and transfers.18 This explains the lower general level
of EMTR curves compared to Bourguignon (1997, p.42) and turns out to be important in the German
case.19 In eﬀect, the German curve computed by Bourguignon drops after the 5th decile and then starts
to rise slightly again. Here, the decrease after the 5th decile is not as pronounced since SSC are accounted
for. Higher deciles progressively beneﬁt from the presence of a ceiling on of SSC (around 3,000 EUR of
monthly gross earnings) which explains the decrease in EMTRs in that range. Note that for the reason
mentioned in the budget curve analysis, the exemption of low earnings from SSC plays only a marginal
role in lowering EMTRs in the ﬁrst decile, at least for inactive people.20
Figure 6 presents the distribution of EMTRs in diﬀerent brackets and compares our ﬁndings with those
16It is important to note that the distribution of EMTRs is quite heterogenous within each decile, due to the complexity
of tax-beneﬁt systems and the fact that deciles are computed on income per unit of consumption. To illustrate this point,
notice for instance that the EMTR of the ﬁrst decile does not reach 100%, which would be the case it was composed only
by inactive household.
17This point depends crucially on the EMTR deﬁnition. In our computations, the 1500 EUR yearly increment implies
that inactive households of the ﬁrst decile are assumed to switch from 0 to 125 EUR per month of earnings, only 35 EUR of
w h i c hw i l lb ec o n s i d e r e di nt h ei n c o m ea s s e s s m e n td u et ot h ed i s r e g a r d .I nt h a tc a s e ,t h eb e n e ﬁt withdrawal rate is around
30%. Additional disregards for workers with children may bring the withdrawal rate down. This eﬀects naturally explain
the relatively lower EMTR in the ﬁrst decile in Germany. A ‘truly marginal’ increment would imply full disregard hence 0
EMTRs for inactive households, which would make cross-country comparisons inconsistent and gives credit to the EMTR
deﬁnition retained here.
18The choice to treat these contributions as taxes is highly debatable but can be justiﬁed to some extent. We do not go
into details here and refer to Bourguignon (1997) for a more in-depth discussion.
19In addition, some instruments have changed since the reference year in Bourguignon (1997), which explain that the
EMTR has decreased for the ﬁrst decile. In particular, the additional disregard for social assistance has been brought up
from 15% to 30% of income higher than 70 EUR.
20The exemption mainly serves lowering EMTRs for secondary earners in couples. This could partly explain the diﬀerences
in EMTRs between men and women. According to our calculation, the proportion of men facing low EMTRs (below 10%)














<0.1 0,5% 5,1% 5,0% 5,1% 0,5% 12,9%
in [0.1; 0.2] 3,2% 3,0% 5,5% 1,0% 0,2% 0,8%
in [0.2; 0.3] 21,3% 22,5% 2,5% 3,6% 2,6% 6,0%
in [0.3; 0.4] 53,0% 49,9% 10,9% 11,7% 4,9% 7,4%
in [0.4; 0.5] 12,9% 12,8% 17,2% 18,6% 32,9% 35,4%
in [0.5; 0.6] 3,6% 2,2% 50,0% 50,1% 45,6% 30,1%
in [0.6; 0.7] 1,0% 0,9% 3,1% 4,1% 7,6% 2,5%
> 0.7 4,4% 3,6% 5,9% 5,8% 5,7% 4,9%
Authors' calculations: using EUROMOD and an absolute increment of 1500 euros/year
Immervoll (2002)'s calculation: using EUROMOD and a relative increment of 3% of the labor income.
France Germany Finland
Figure 6: Distribution of EMTRs
of Immervoll (2002). Although diﬀerent deﬁnitions to compute EMTRs are used, results are close enough
to derive similar conclusions.21 In all three countries, between 4 and 6% of the active or potentially
active population face EMTRs above 70%. The concerned population is concentrated in the lower part
of the distribution, although some heterogeneity can be found across countries on the exact location of
these households in the income distribution (see ﬁgure 5). Overall, withdrawal of means-tested transfers -
minimum income and housing beneﬁts (with a restriction for France) - is the main cause for high implicit
taxation. This feature is common to the three countries we examine while they present wide heterogeneity
on other accounts (level of income taxation, initial conditions, etc.). This heterogeneity is exploited in
what follows. In all three countries, the inactivity trap phenomena has led national advisors to promote
job-enhancing policies.22
2.2 ‘Making work pay’ policies
Overall, a consensus seems to emerge on the need for MWP policies in Europe and on essential aspects of
their design (see Duncan, 2003). This view is nevertheless muddied on the one hand by concerns regarding
t h er e l a t i v ee ﬃciency of such instruments in redistributing income and increasing work incentives and on
the other hand by the fact that there is no unique deﬁnition of a MWP policy. We brieﬂyd e s c r i b et h e s e
aspects and the recent trends in the UK, Belgium and the three countries under consideration.
2.2.1 A brief survey of MWP policies
Firstly, it is important to recall that the MWP expression encompasses two types of policies aimed
at enhancing employment opportunities. On the one hand, some policies act on the demand-side by
reducing the cost of hiring low-skilled workers. Cuts in taxes or social contributions paid by employers
have been introduced in several countries throughout much of the 80s and 90s (Austria, Belgium, France,
the Netherlands and to some extent in the UK through a progressive contribution scheme). Other
21Note that the deﬁnition of EMTR when computed numerically is arbitrary and may condition the results to some
extent. As seen before, the shape of EMTRs depends on the family member whose income is incremented, the concept of
income to be incremented (gross, net, etc.) and the type of increment (absolute or relative amount). See Immervoll (2002)
for an in-depth discussion.
22Previous results on the detrimental role of social assistance on incentives are conﬁrmed by Immervoll (2002) for several
other European countries.
8countries have targeted employment subsidies to employers of youngsters, long-term unemployed and
welfare recipients. An in depth discussion is provided in Martin and Grubb (2001).
On the other hand, some MWP policies are designed to create incentives to take up low paid work.
In-work beneﬁt sh a v eb e e ni np l a c ef o ral o n gt i m ei nt h eU Sw i t ht h eE I T Ca n di nt h eU Kw i t ht h e
Family Credit and its successors. Canada, Ireland and New Zealand have also had a relatively long
experience of such schemes. Since 2000, MWP policies have been spreading rapidly in Europe and some
important changes have occurred in the UK. The oﬃcial objective set forth by policy makers is double: (i)
to expand employment by increasing work incentives, (ii) to increase income of disadvantaged groups (see
Pearson, 2002). The second objective is clearly redistributive and in-work beneﬁts seem an interesting
way to redistribute to the ‘working poor’. Such instruments are often seen as more desirable and more
politically acceptable than an increase in social assistance given the minor eﬀect on work disincentives and
the targeting on the ‘deserving poor’; they also seen as more eﬃcient than an increase in the minimum
wage, which might push up wage rates above the market equilibrium and hence lower the employment
rate.23
Wise economic governance should naturally establish a subtle mix of actions on supply and demand,
and ﬁx a minimum wage in order to maintain a sound labor market equilibrium with decent wages for
workers and low employer costs. Yet, this goes far beyond the scope of this paper which speciﬁcally
addresses the incentive issue on the supply side. Consequently, we shall refer to MWP policies only in
terms of labor-supply enhancing transfers in what follows.
2.2.2 Individual versus family-based MWP schemes
A crucial aspect in the design of a MWP scheme is the treatment of the family dimension, and, more
precisely, the choice of the unit retained to assess income. Two broad groups of possible schemes are
usually encountered, although hybrid measures also exist.
On the one hand, some countries have introduced family-based measures, that is, in-work transfers
which depend on household size and which are means-tested on family income. This type of reform, in
the fashion of the EITC and the WFTC, is known to be well-targeted to poor working families. However,
while the reform unequivocally encourages the participation of single individuals, it is often the case that
it discourages second-earners in couples, bringing about a gender bias against the participation of women
(see Eissa and Hoynes, 1998, and Blundell et al., 2000, among others). Moreover, the generosity of the
reform implies a high taper rate in the phase-out portion of the measure and, hence, large increases in
EMTRs and potential disincentives at the intensive margin.
On the other hand, some countries like Belgium have experienced purely individualized measures,
conditioned on individual earnings only. Given a similar budgetary cost, this type of measure clearly
implies smaller beneﬁts and larger numbers of recipients. Indeed, low-paid individuals in well-oﬀ families
may well receive some transfers. This policy is considered to have greater incentive eﬀects than the
family-based alternative as (i) it has no discouraging eﬀects on second-earners in a couple and (ii) the
less generous amounts imply smaller increases in EMTRs in the phase-out region.
To account for the family dimension or to alternatively retain the individual as the unit of interest
could have a serious impact on the way reforms contribute to the policy objectives. Targeting low-
23Note however that setting a high minimum wage while subsidising employer costs could be identical in eﬀect to having
lower minimum wage and subsidising in-work income. The choice to subsidise employers rather than employees depends on
what works best in a particular institutional setting. This in turn depends in particular on which of the two categories is
more sensitive to prices. Let us recall that there is no wage ﬂo o ri nF i n l a n da n dG e r m a n y .
9income families rather than low-wage workers is likely to achieve more redistribution but to have more
ambiguous incentive eﬀects. Eﬃciency and redistributive objectives seem somewhat contradictory while
they are both quoted to justify investments in MWP measures. Things are in fact even more intricate
given that enhancing employment is viewed by many as a way to reduce poverty through increased labor
income. In this respect, it must be noted that single individuals - and mostly lone parents - constitute the
largest group of poor households;24 generous amounts of transfer from a WFTC-type scheme may then
have both redistributive and incentive eﬀects on such vulnerable groups. To disentangle these various
aspects, we suggest in the next section an in-depth investigation of the role of family-based and individual
MWP in achieving social inclusion and poverty reduction both on the overall and for speciﬁc groups of
the population.
2.2.3 Recent trends in the UK and in Belgium
Before illustrating the recent trends in the three countries we focus on, it is important to brieﬂys k e t c h
the UK experience which has served as a benchmark to our study as well as to policy makers throughout
Europe. In complement to this family-based policy, we also review the Belgian case which represents an
interesting example of purely individualized policy.
The Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) introduced in the UK in October 1999 is a more generous
variant of the Family Credit (FC).25 It is a transfer to households with children where at least one of
the adults is in paid work (employment or self-employment) for at least 16 hours per week. It tops up
jointly assessed income. Once income reaches a threshold level, the maximum amount is tapered away, at
a rate of 55% on net income (to be compared to 20% in the EITC system and 50% in the Self-suﬃciency
program in Canada); income is assessed after income tax and contributions have been paid; the maximum
amount of beneﬁt increases with the number of children, but is paid at the same rate for couples and
individuals; a 20% premium is paid if at least 30 weekly hours are worked by at least one of the eligible
adults.
Introduced by a major reform in April 2003, the new structure involves two separate credits: a
refundable Child Tax Credit (CTC) to support children in low-income families, regardless of the work
status of the parents, and a Working Tax Credit (WTC) now extended to childless singles and couples.
The former component rolls together most of the main elements in the tax-beneﬁts y s t e mf o rc h i l d r e n
(with the exception of the child beneﬁt); this includes the child elements in Income Support and in the
WFTC, child additions to contributory beneﬁts and the Children’s Tax Credit (a “true” tax credit of
modest size). Note that this instrument targets an additional UK-speciﬁc social policy objective, the
reduction of child poverty. The WTC is aimed at supporting low earnings and encouraging labor market
participation, hence extended to all types of households. Note that there was a 48% premium per child
in the WFTC scheme. This is no longer the case with the new WTC but the basic amount is larger for
lone parents and couples (£3,025 per year in 2003) than for childless singles (£1,525). The combined
components make total transfers more generous than under the WFTC for households with children. For
instance, the maximum entitlement per year for a lone parent with one child is £3,180 in 1998 (FC),
£4,160 in 2001 (WFTC) and £3,025 (WTC) plus £1,990 (family and child elements of the CTC) in
2003.26
24According to Buchel, Mertens and Orsini (2003), poverty risk for single mothers is 3 to 5 time larger than the poverty risk
for the whole population in the UK and Germany, respectively. In France and Finland too lone mothers face a considerably
higher poverty rates (around twice the poverty rate of the whole population).
25See evaluation of the FC by Duncan and Giles (1996).
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single mothers 2.2 0 0.5 0.2 2.2 34 000 1,9% 28 600
women in couples, 
partner working
0.2 0.7 0 0.1 -0.5 -20 000 -0,8% -29 050
women in couples, 
partner not working
1.3 0 0.4 0.1 1.3 11 000 1,8% 14 610
men in couples, partner 
working
0 -0.3 - (*) - -0.3 -10 500 0,1% 1 790
men in couples, partner 
not working
0.4 0 - - 0.4 13 000 0,5% 16 820
total 27 500 32 770
Note (*): on data evidence, men in the model are restricted to a choice between not working and full-time employment.
Figures from Blundell, Duncan, Meghir and McCrae (2000) except (2) from Gregg, Johnson and Reed (IFS, 1999)
Simulated responses to WFTC (%)
Figure 7: Labor supply responses to the WFTC in the UK
No ex-post evaluation of the WFTC reform is yet available and studies rely on ex-ante predictions
based on microsimulation software and structural models of labor supply. Using the Family Resource
Survey and the tax-beneﬁt model TAXBEN3, Blundell et al. (2000) evaluate the distributional changes
and the labor supply responses to the WFTC.27 It is found that nearly 80% of lone parents in part-
time employment (between 16 and 30 hours per week) are to beneﬁt from the reform. As for couples,
the credit seems more generous for one-earner households, a third of which would beneﬁtf r o mi t .T h e
impact on hours is ambiguous as the number of households with an EMTR above 70% decrease by around
450,000 while households with an EMTR above 50% increase by about the same amount. This is due
to a lower taper rate (55% instead of 70% with the FC) entailing a smaller positive impact on EMTRs
but for a larger number of people. As shown in Figure 7, the net change in participation rate would
consist of an increase by 2.2 percentage points for single mothers (34,000 individuals) and a decrease by
0.57 percentage points (20,000 individuals) for married women with employed partners. Combining all
the behavioral eﬀects, the WFTC leads to a small increase in overall participation, by just above 27,000
individuals. Labor supply responses to the WFTC should act to reduce the cost of the program by around
14%. Consequently, the distributive impact of the reform - rather than the incentive eﬀects - has been
appealed to to justify the large cost of the reform. On the eﬃciency side, it has been recommended to
view the credit in combination with other policy measures which could restore incentives for those living
in couples, as for instance, an increase in the minimum wage or an income tax reform (a 10% starting
rate).
In August 2001 the Belgian government introduced a refundable earned income tax credit (Cr´ edit
d’impˆ ot sur les bas revenus de l’activit´ e professionnelle). One of the major objectives was to reduce the
burden on labor income in general and of taxpayers with low earning capacity in particular. The Belgian
tax credit is being implemented on a progressive basis. As in the case for the income taxation schedule, the
credit is individualized. It is computed on the basis of all income from professional activities (including
wages and self employment income), net of professional deductions and of earned income subject to
on the age of the children in the FC scheme and the ﬁgure given here assumes the lowest premium rate (25.3%).
27See also Duncan and Giles (1998), Dilnot and McCrae (1999) or Gregg et al. (1999).
11separate taxation (income from self-employment is also disregarded when the latter is complementary
activity). Eligibility is conditional on having a yearly gross income between 3,850 and 16,680 EUR and
on working at least 13 hours, so that the measure targets workers with an income around the minimum
wage and clearly distinguishes between low productivity and low eﬀort. (ﬁgures refer to the 2003 system
and apply to 2002 incomes). The phasing-in is relatively sharp whereas the phase-out segment starts at
12,840 EUR. In 2005, the maximum yearly amount of the beneﬁt should reach 510 EUR, but it is likely
to increase substantially in the future28.
2.2.4 Recent policy changes in France, Germany and Finland
Neither Finland nor Germany have introduced in work transfers stricto sensu but have focused on income
tax allowances and reduction of social contributions for low income. In France, a refundable tax credit
has been implemented. In addition to a brief description of the newly introduced reforms, it is shown
below that their generosity is far below the level of transfers implied by the British reforms. This is
an additional motivation for the present study as we suggest what would happen in Finland, France
and Germany, would these countries have dedicated the same budgetary expenses as the UK to MWP
transfers.
France The issue of poverty traps has been widely debated in France as proved by the large number
of related studies from national experts, and notably Bourguignon (1997), Bourguignon and Chiappori
(1998), Laroque and Salani´ e (2000), Godino et al. (1999) and Pisani-Ferry (2000). Following the recom-
mendation of these authors, the French government has introduced in 2001 a refundable earned income
tax credit known as Prime pour l’Emploi (PPE), which is a hybrid measure targeted both on individual
earnings and on household income.
To be eligible, at least one member of the household must be employed. Jointly assessed taxable
income must be lower than 11,972 EUR per year (2003 ﬁgures) for a single plus additional increments
per dependent child.29 Each worker in the household opens the right to a tax credit, provided that his or
her individual taxable income falls between 3,265 EUR and 23,207 EUR per year (note that the lower
bound is similar to the Belgian one). In the early versions of the tax credit, these amounts corresponded
to 0.3a n d1 .4 times the yearly income of a worker receiving the minimum wage. The tax credit is
computed as 4.4% of the individual’s labor income, expressed in full-year and full-time equivalent. As a
result, the level of tax credit is conditional on the work duration and distinguishes between low skills and
low eﬀorts. The maximum amount of credit (443 EUR) is obtained for a full-time and full-year activity
paid at the minimum wage rate. In 2003, a 45% premium for part-time work has been introduced. Later
versions of the reform are presented in Carrez (2002) and potential eﬀects on employment are analyzed
in Bargain (2004b).
Germany In 2000, the German parliament has adopted a large reform of the income tax system in which
the basic personal allowance was signiﬁcantly raised and tax rates signiﬁcantly lowered. A description
and complete analysis of the reforms can be found in Haan and Steiner (2004).
28Orsini (2004) describes and analyses the 2001 Belgian tax reform and ﬁnds mitigate labor supply eﬀects related to the
individualized tax credit component.
29This is doubled for a married couple, which amounts to 3.1 times the labor income of a worker paid at the minimum
wage. Bargain (2004b) shows that this is suﬃciently high to avoid the discouragement of second earners encountered with
the WFTC.
12The oﬃcial objective of the reform is to decrease the overall tax burden, especially on low-paid
workers in order to stimulate employment. The reform is being progressively phased in over the 2000-
2005 period. By 2005, the tax rate in the ﬁrst tax bracket should fall to 15% (from 22.9% in 2000) while
the top rate should be cut to 42% (from 51% in 2000) in order to reach international standards. The
personal income tax allowance will be increased from 6,902 up to 7,664 EUR in 2005, but will continue
not to be refundable. Hence, the maximum net gain obtained in the ﬁrst tax bracket will be around
1,115 EUR per year.
In addition, several proposals have been made to subsidize low-wage earners through extended exemp-
tions from social contribution payments. Three of them have ranked high on the German political agenda
and have been reviewed by Bonin, Kempe and Schneider (2002). Interestingly enough, with respect to the
previous discussion, two of these proposals employ individual subsidy schemes whereas the third subsidy
derives from a joint income assessment in the couple. The CSU (resp. social democrat) proposal consists
in exempting monthly earnings below 400 EUR (resp. 510) from contributions to social insurance (which
raises the 2002 income bound by 75 EUR) and in phasing-out the exemption until gross earnings reach
800 EUR (resp. 1280). Under the last policy proposal (the so-called Mainzer model), entitlement to the
reduction depends on a joint assessment of household labor income and the lower and upper bounds of the
phase-out region are respectively 650 and 1590 EUR for singles (twice these amounts for couples). This
way, the policy covers a wider range of earnings, including a large share of one-earner couples. Bonin,
Kempe and Schneider ﬁnd moderate wage elasticities and conclude that these subsidy policies could not
be very eﬀective. New orientations tend to privilege workfare concepts, that is, to render social beneﬁts
conditional on work (‘mini-jobs’).
Finland In Finland, reforms have occurred mainly in the 1996-2002 period, following the recommen-
dations of a working group whose proposals are analyzed by Laine (2002). The important policy measure
for our concerns is the introduction of an earned income allowance in municipal taxation of employment
income in 1997. In order to reach very low earners, the deduction concerns income taxation for mu-
nicipalities rather than state income tax as the latter targets relatively higher ranges of income. The
maximum allowance was 925 EUR in 1998 and it has increased progressively up to 3,550 EUR in 2004.
Unlike the refundable tax credits, the eﬀect of such an allowance is limited since the gain (in terms of
disposable income) corresponds to the deduction times the marginal tax rate. With an average municipal
t a xr a t eo f1 9 .5% (excl. church tax), it then turns out that taxes saved yearly reach a maximum of around
190 EUR in 1998 and 692 EUR in 2004. Such amounts - 16 EUR per month in 1998 - are suﬃciently
small not to interfere with the simulations of more generous MWP schemes we suggested here for the
year of reference 1998.
3 Simulation of in-work transfers in three European countries
The reforms simulated hereafter are in line with the two broad groups of policies surveyed in the previous
section, that is, household-based vs. individual in-work transfers. It has appeared natural to opt on
the one hand for a modiﬁed version of the WFTC, a measure conditional on family income, and, on
the other hand, for an individual low-wage subsidy. These reforms shall henceforth be referred to as
the working tax credit (WTC) and the low-wage subsidy (LWS). The WTC we suggest is based on the
essential features of the 2001 British WFTC, extended to childless singles or couples. We now describe
and compare the main features of both reforms.
13Firstly, it should be noted that our WTC does not correspond to the reform implemented in the UK
in 2003 and mentioned in section 2. In the new British system, the child premium is universalized in a
new instrument (the Child Tax Credit). Instead, we have maintained the child element of the WFTC.
Policies aimed at recreating signiﬁcant ﬁnancial diﬀerence between social assistance and paid work must
be scaled on family size just as social assistance beneﬁts, in order to tailor the ﬁnancial gain from taking
up work for all household types.30 By deﬁnition, the wage subsidy is individual and does not account for
the family dimension nor for the presence of other incomes.
Both reforms should target those with a signiﬁcant degree of participation. This can be done by
phasing-in the instrument; this is the choice retained for the LWS as the amount of transfer is proportional
to work duration. Alternatively, payments can be made discontinuously conditional on hours worked.
With the WFTC, hence with our WTC, 16 hours are necessary to become eligible and a premium is given
above 30 hours.
By construction, each reform is meant to emphasize one of the two policy objectives (even if they both
attempt to simultaneously cover incentive and redistributive issues). In this respect, the WTC reform is
phased out in order to increase targeting and reduceb u d g e t a r yc o s t s .A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h eL W Si ss e t
out as an essentially incentive measure; it is not phased-out but simply conditioned on the wage rate.
Another crucial aspect is the interaction with existing policy instruments. The LWS is simply added
to the present tax-beneﬁt system. The WTC interacts with several instruments which are fairly diﬀerent
across countries. In this view, we have continuously tried to balance international comparability and
overall coherence in each institutional setting, as detailed below.
Finally, it is possible to ﬁnance the reforms by direct taxation, through, for instance, a change in
the income tax rates. This choice would necessarily imply additional labor supply eﬀects which would
make diﬃcult the analysis of the eﬀects speciﬁc to the MWP policies under study. Consequently, we
simply assume alternative ways to let the reforms be ﬁnancially neutral. One could in particular think
of governmental budget reallocation or of an increase in indirect taxation (essentially a proportional tax
on consumption) which would not aﬀect neither labor supply behavior nor vertical distribution. More
important than revenue-neutrality, reforms must assure to be comparable one with the other. For this
purpose, we calibrate the LWS in such a way that it reaches the same real cost - after behavioral responses
-a st h eW T Cp o l i c y .
3.1 A family-based working tax credit
3.1.1 Design and simulation hypotheses
The rules of the WTC are based on the description given in section 2 for the 2001 WFTC. The formula
to compute total household entitlement is as follows:
WTC = B − max(0;(z − θ)t)
with B the maximum theoretical amount, θ the threshold or disregard, t the taper rate and z the (jointly
assessed) net income of the household. According to 2001 WFTC rules, the taper rate t equals 55%; this
corresponds roughly to 37% on gross income in the UK but to diﬀerent percentages across the countries
30Optimally, child increments should be set according to the equivalence scales of national social assistance schemes in
order to maintain a suﬃcient ﬁnancial gap between inactivity and activity, in particular for households with children. For
comparability purposes, we have opted for a homogeneous choice across countries, namely the equivalence scale of the 2001
WFTC. The deﬁnition of a qualifying child we retain, however, is the same as in the national social assistance scheme of
each country.
14we examine. The maximum amount of beneﬁt B is 74.6 EUR/week for a childless household.31 Maximum
entitlement does not depend on the number of adults but increases by 49% per dependent child. The
threshold θ amounts to 128.3E U Rp e rw e e k . 32 Other features of the WFTC are taken into account.33
In the assessment of family income z, all main sources are included net of income tax and social se-
curity contributions. These include earnings, self-employment income, unemployment beneﬁts, pensions,
irregular incomes, capital income and maintenance income (contrary to the WFTC rules, we include
children’s earnings in addition to adults’ labour income).34 I nt h eU K ,t h ei n c o m ea s s e s s m e n tf o rt h e
WFTC is the same as for social assistance (Income Support)s ot h a ta l lb e n e ﬁts are included with the
exception of the Child Beneﬁt, the Maternity Beneﬁt and the Statutory Maternity Pay plus small UK-
speciﬁc disregards on maintenance payments and war pensions. In a similar way, we have made sure
that in France, the assessment includes all the family transfers as in the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion
(minimum income scheme, RMI hereafter) and the Allocation pour Parents Isol´ es (minimum income for
lone parents, API hereafter), with the exception of the most generous child beneﬁt( Allocation Famil-
iale).35 In Finland and Germany too, WTC assessment is modelled along the lines of existing social
assistance beneﬁts (Toimeentulotuki in Finland, Sozialhilfe in Germany), child beneﬁts being excluded
as well as some speciﬁc disregards (the aforementioned disregard on low earned income in Germany).
The other sensitive issue in modelling WTC concerns the way it interacts with the rest of the system.
WTC is not itself part of the income tax base or of the resource base to compute means tested family
beneﬁts (in France) but enters income assessment of minimum income schemes.36 Diﬀerently from the
UK, we model income from WTC not to enter the assessment for housing beneﬁts as the latter impact in
turn on the conditioning of minimum income schemes (either directly, in Finland, or through a lump-sum,
in France).
3.1.2 Impact on budget curves
We now look at hypothetical budget constraints to comment on the eﬀects of the reform on the systems
in force. These examples are merely illustrative and the analyses should not be generalized to widely to
the ‘real’ population.
In Figure 8, we illustrate the budget constraint of a single individual (here for Germany).37 We have
mentioned already that budget curves as represented in our study assume that labor income increase is
due to an increase in work duration up to 40 hours (ﬁrst half of the X axis) and to pay rises thereafter
31This ﬁgure corresponds to the $54/week in the 2001 WFTC rules, which correspond to $50.6 in 1998 prices (inﬂation
of 6.8% over the three year period).
32This ﬁgure corresponds to $92.9/week in 2001 which gives $87 in 1998 prices. For B and θ, absolute amounts are taken
from the British reform and simply converted using 1998 exchange rates (0.67833 $/EUR). Alternatively, we could have
chosen relative amounts computed as a function of a national reference such as the average equivalized income. Results
would then possibly be sensitive to the reference ﬁgure chosen.
33This includes the childcare credit and a further condition that the family should have less than $8000 worth of capital.
These are not modelled since information on childcare is not reliable and wealth is ill-deﬁned in the data.
34In the UK, income from capital is not itself included but an assumed tariﬀ income is calculated instead.
35Other means-tested transfers for children are accounted for; housing beneﬁt is not included directly but though a
lump-sum (see Bargain and Terraz, 2001, for a description).
36Note that in Germany, the level of social assistance impacts in turn on the type and level of housing beneﬁts, since
Sozialhilfe recipients are entitled to an increased amount. Similarly, in France, a positive level of social assistance implies
that labor income or replacement income (unemployment beneﬁts) are not accounted for in the income assessment for the
computation of housing beneﬁts. In Finland, on the other hand, eligibility conditions for social assistance and housing
beneﬁts are independent.
37Budget curves under the WTC scenario for all three countries and for all typical household types (single, single plus
children, one- and two-earner couples with children) are available upon request.
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Figure 8: Impact of the reform on the budget curve of a single individual (Germany)
(second half of the X axis). The 16 and 30 hours thresholds are particularly evident, as they correspond
to WTC eligibility and full time premium. The main groups of tax-beneﬁt instruments are pictured
and their interaction with the WTC appears clearly. The two dotted lines represent disposable income
before and after the reform. The diﬀerence between these two lines corresponds to the net gain for the
household which - for Germany - is depicted in Figure 9. It turns out to be much smaller than the
amount of the transfer, as WTC enters income assessment for social assistance. This eﬀect occurs in all
countries and is maximum in the case of Germany, due to a more generous safety net. Figure 9 shows
that the maximum net gains are in a range between 10,000 and 15,000 EUR instead of between the
5,000 − 10,000 EUR as might be supposed by looking at the WTC alone. It also appears that in all
countries, the reform recreates a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial diﬀerence between non-participation and full-time
activity, unambiguously enhancing the probability of participation for single individuals or lone parents.
Figure 10 shows the budget constraint of the second-earner in a couple (here for France), conditional
on the ﬁrst-earner working 40 hours a week at minimum wage. Disposable income when secondary
earner works zero hours increases due to the WTC received by the ﬁrst-earner, but the amount of
transfer decreases as the second-earner increases his/her working time. The ﬁnancial incentive to work
for secondary earners decreases in comparison to the pre-reform situation. The dashed line represents
the indiﬀerence curve tangent to the new budget constraint. Clearly, the second-earner will reduce hours
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Figure 9: WTC reform for a single individual (Germany)
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Figure 10: Impact of the reform on the budget curve of a two-earner couple with two children (France)
173.2 An individual wage subsidy
3.2.1 Design and simulation hypotheses
The LWS reform consists of increasing individual labor income y = wh by a percentage A.38 The wage
subsidy decreases if the wage rate is larger than a lower bound αW until it falls to zero at an upper bound
βW. Both bounds are expressed as factors α and β times a reference wage W. These three parameters
may be chosen to optimally tailor the reform to the wage distribution in each country. A natural choice
for the reference wage W could be the country-speciﬁc wage ﬂoor, which does unfortunately not exist
in Germany and Finland in 1998. Instead, we opt for the 10% cut-point of the wage distribution of
each country, which corresponds to 6.09 EUR per hour for France (close to the 1998 French minimum
wage), 6.79 for Finland and 7.42 for Germany. To reduce the number of degrees of freedom, we simply
ﬁx homogeneous values across countries (α =1a n dβ =1 .4)39.
The supplement factor A is country-speciﬁc and calibrated iteratively in order to reach the same
budgetary cost for both WTC and LWS reforms. After calibration, we ﬁnd A = 12% for Finland, 20.5%
for France and 13% for Germany. The formula to compute the level of the LWS is written as follows:
LWS = Ay if w/W ≤ α




3.2.2 Impact on budget curves
The impact of the LWS is shown in Figure 11 in the case of a single individual (here for Finland). This
way, the amount of wage supplement Awh increases linearly with working time (phasing-in) at a ﬂat rate
Aw so that the slope of the budget curve gets steeper. After hitting 40 hours, in the middle of the X-axis,
the wage rate increases and the beneﬁt starts to decrease as soon as it exceeds the reference wage (6.79
EUR for Finland). The LWS clearly appears as a new layer on top of all existing instruments.
3.3 Distribution of working hours, earnings and wage rates
We have previously reviewed the diﬀerent types of framework conditions which are of potential relevance
when designing and evaluating MWP policies. The primordial question of the size of the labor supply
elasticities is the subject of the next section. Thew a yt h eW T Ci n t e r a c t sw i t ht h ee x i s t i n gs y s t e mi s
also a crucial aspect which has been investigated in the previous budget curve analysis. We focus here on
the structural diﬀerences across countries which may explain the diﬀerences in the direct eﬀects of each
reform (cost, targeting, etc.).
Figure 12 details the participation rate of each country’s population, and more precisely, the proportion
of households where at least one member works at least 16 hours a week, that is, the proportion of
households theoretically entitled to the WTC. Eligibility also depends on household income but diﬀerences
in participation rates appear large enough across countries to predict a higher rate of eligibility in Finland
than in France and higher in the latter than in Germany.
38It is assumed that authorities are able to collect information relative to work duration or, equivalently hourly wage
rates, both in a reliable way and with no additional administrative cost.
39The individual tax credit applied in France since 2001 is also phased out between 1 and 1.4 time the minimum hourly
wage.
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Figure 11: Impact of the reform on the budget curve of a single individual (Finland)
France Germany Finland
household in work 59,4% 51,4% 79,2%
household with h>15 h/week 58,4% 50,6% 78,1%
Source: authors' computation.
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Figure 13: Distribution of hourly wage rate vs labor income for women
The distributions of females’ wage rates and labor incomes, represented in Figure 13, are also impor-
tant to explain the impact of the reforms.40 The Figure reveals that for female workers, the distribution of
wage rates in Finland is slightly more concentrated than i nF r a n c ea n di nF r a n c et h a ni nG e r m a n y .T h i s
observation seems in line with the literature on wage inequalities which usually places France between
Scandinavian countries and Finland on one side and the UK and Germany on the other. Cross-country
diﬀerences in the concentration of incomes are even larger and in particular, the distribution of income
becomes much more unequal in France and Germany. This is explained by overall larger wage-elasticities
in these countries, as shall be seen below. Larger wage-elasticities indeed mean that labor supply increases
more with wage rates so that the distribution of labor income is more unequal than the distribution of
skills (see Stern, 1986).41
The distribution of incomes is naturally what matters for the design of the WTC. An important
consideration is the shape of the distribution and the diﬀerent across countries on that account. In
particular, it is remarkable that a larger density of workers is found in a lower income range in France as
compared to Finland. This way, it is likely that a greater proportion of households will be found in the
ﬂat segment of the WTC in France, whereas a larger density of the population in the phase-out region
or above in Finland. This could imply smaller average amounts of WTC in Finland and, to some extent,
partially oﬀset the diﬀerences in theoretical eligibility (explained above by diﬀerences in participation
rates).
I nt h ec a s eo ft h eL W Sp o l i c y ,t h ed i ﬀerences in wage rate distributions must be considered. In addition
to the general observations above, it is remarkable that the log-normal distribution for France presents a
much steeper tail on the left-hand side, due to the existence of a wage ﬂoor. The important feature here
is the concentration of wage rates in the eligibility zone which is itself tailored in function of the wage
distribution: the lower bound upper which the LWS starts to decrease with the wage rate corresponds
to the wage reference W (the wage value at the frontier of the ﬁrst decile) while the eligibility ends at
1.4W. Wage rates are concentrated in lower ranges in France and Finland; the same feature applies to
male wages, although represented here. Higher concentration in Finland implies relatively more eligible
individuals, ceteris paribus.
40Similar graphs for men are not provided as diﬀerences in concentrations are less signiﬁcant, either across countries or
between the distribution of wage rates and the distribution of labor incomes.
41Naturally, more precise statement would imply to look at the distribution of elasticities in the sample.
204 Labor supply modeling
A key issue in determining the impact of reforms is the elasticity of labor supply to exogenous changes
in budget constraints. We simply look at own wage-elasticities to provide an order of magnitude of the
potential labor supply responsiveness across countries.
To model labor supply, we rely on the recently developed technique based on a structural unitary
model with discrete work hours.42 Following many examples in the literature, we focus solely on female
labor supply. This choice is usually motivated by the fact that female participation is lower and working
hour are more variable than men’s, as female work is often regarded as a second source of earnings.43 At
the same time, male labor supply is known to be very inelastic to moderately sized exogenous changes in
the budget constraint,44 whilst inactivity is mostly explained by demand-side rationing in the countries
we consider. Consequently, we simply treat male labor supply as ﬁx e da to b s e r v e dv a l u e s . 45
Female labor supply is supposed to vary discretely between full-time, part-time and non-participation.
This strategy incorporates explicitly the evidence that most salary workers are constrained to choose
among a limited set of options due to social/institutional norms and demand-side rigidities. Concentra-
tions of hours around part-time and full-time work is evident in the distributions of hours (see Figures in
the Appendices). Self-employed workers may have more freedom to choose in a continuous range of hours
but are not included in our selection. Note that one of the most prominent aspects of modern literature
on labor supply, as surveyed by Heckman (1993), is the fact that labor supply responsiveness is much
larger at the extensive margin.46 In this respect, our modelling strategy focuses mainly on participation
decisions, even though the possible variations in hours are partially captured by the part-time option.
The model, and the estimation results are described in the Appendices.
Estimates are used to compute elasticities. Evaluating elasticities at the sample mean is not very
informative - in a highly nonlinear model like ours - on the consequence of wage changes in a heterogeneous
population. Instead, we compute wage-elasticities numerically and averaged over the whole sample. To
do so, we increase female wage rates uniformly by 1% and 10% and simulate in each case the subsequent
changes in average work duration and in the participation rate.47
42See Van Soest (1995) for the Netherlands, Hoynes (1996) for the US and Blundell et al. (2000) for the UK, among
others.
43See Laroque and Salani´ e (2002) for a recent comprehensive discussion.
44This has been justiﬁed on sociological grounds and proved extensively in labor supply literature (see surveys from
Pencavel,1986, or more recently Blundell and MaCurdy, 2000). An option would be to model only participation decisions
for men. Yet, in the countries we examine, the number of inactive men remaining after the selection process appears too
s m a l lt od os o .
45Even if one does not believe in the ‘second-earner’ model of the household decision process, it seems reasonable to
think that the suggested reforms should not have any negative impact on the participation of men in couple; they should
not have any positive impact either as the selected sample contains very few inactive couples; considering the extremely
low elasticities of hours, the impact at the intensive margin can also be ignored in a ﬁrst approximation. The approach
is slightly more detrimental if we consider single men as some inactive ones may be encouraged to take up a job with the
reforms; however, inactive single men are under-representated in most surveys and disapear almost completely after the
selection process described in the Appendices. To capture the impact of in-work policies on this sub-population, speciﬁc
datasets are required. Gurgand and Margolis (1998) make use of a survey on minimum income recipients in France.
46The most recent and convincing proofs are precisely provided by natural experiments related to in-work transfers.
For instance, Meyer (2003) studies the changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit in the US between 1990 and 1996. He
shows that nearly all of the labor supply adjustment by single mothers in response to these changes occured at the extensive
margin. The weakness of adjustment in working hours is merely explained by behavi o r sa n dn o tc o n n e c t e dt oa ne x p l a n a t i o n
in term of rationing of worked hours (the US labor market presenting a much more continuous distribution of work hours
than in continental Europe).
47Transition frequencies are the means over 200 simulated transitions. Each transition is obtained by calibration of the
stochastic part of the utility at each hour choice in order to obtain a perfect match between observed and predicted hours
21wage + 1% wage + 10% wage + 1% wage + 10%
0.62% 5.91% 0.12% 1.09%
[0.54; 0.74] [5.2; 6.5] [0.07; 0.16] [0.8; 1.4]
0.15% 1.42% 0.28% 2.66%
[0.11; 0.19] [1.0; 1.8] [0.19; 0.39] [1.8; 3.4]
0.40% 3.77% 0.16% 1.44%
[0.32; 0.47] [3.1; 4.5] [0.10; 0.22] [0.9; 1.8]
country
Elasticities are computed using averaged simulated transitions; figures in brackets give a bootstrapped 90% confidence 




women in couples single women
Figure 14: Change in female average working hours
wage + 1% wage + 10% wage + 1% wage + 10%
0.55% 5.20% 0.07% 0.61%
[0.48; 0.65] [4.6;5.8] [0.03; 0.10] [0.4; 0.7]
0.15% 1.40% 0.27% 2.61%
[0.11; 0.19] [1.0; 1.7] [0.19; 0.39] [1.8; 3.3]
0.33% 3.22% 0.13% 1.19%
[0.25; 0.39] [2.7; 3.8] [0.07; 0.19] [0.8; 1.5]
single women
country
Elasticities are computed using averaged simulated transitions; figures in brackets give a bootstrapped 90% confidence 





Figure 15: Change in female participation rate
Elasticities presented in Figures 14 and 15 are in line with recent labor supply literature (see Blundell
and MaCurdy, 2000). Being moderately sized, they suggest a relatively modest potential response to
tax-beneﬁt reforms. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences across country are not surprising, as we suggest in the fol-
lowing review of literature. Note that the ﬁgures presented here are only average values while it may be
interesting to compare the distribution. By construction, elasticities of working hours implicitly account
for participation eﬀects in the present paper, which may not be the case in all the studies quoted below.
For France, the values we obtain compare well with the order of magnitude of recent ﬁndings, even if
slightly higher, which may simply be due to diﬀerent data selection hypotheses. Bargain (2004a), indeed,
focuses on married/cohabiting females with working partners only. This way, matching aspects between
partners imply a higher participation level for these women hence lower elasticities. Chon´ e et al. (2003)
study only couples with at least one child under the age of seven. Participation elasticities lie around
0.3i nb o t hs t u d i e sw h e nt h ec e n s o r s h i pe ﬀect of the minimum wage is not accounted for. Small values
convey to the idea that there may not be as much scope for incentive reforms as thought in previous
studies of the labor supply of women in France.48
for the pre-reform situation. Conﬁdence intervals for each transition cell and summary measure are simulated by drawing
200 times from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the parameter estimates and for each of those parameter draws,
applying the calibration method to build transition matrices. The same technique is applied to simulate the labor supply
eﬀects of a reform. See Bargain (2004a) for a more detailed description.
48In Blundell and Laisney (1988) and Bourguignon and Magnac (1990), elasticities obtained using the Hausman technique
appeared implausibly high (above 1). Bourguignon and Magnac ﬁnd their results to be very sensitive to several aspects of
the speciﬁcation; when ﬁxed costs are added to the model to account for participation eﬀects, the wage-elasticity becomes
extremely small (0.05) as it captures only the variations in hours for the the average household.
22In Germany, results are in the range of recent estimates provided by Bonin, Kempe and Schneider
(2002), Haan (2004), Steiner and Wrohlich (2003) and Haan and Steiner (2004). All these studies rely on
the GSOEP (2000 wave in the ﬁrst study, 2001 in the second and third studies and 2002 in the last one).
Bonin et al. (2002) ﬁnd own wage-elasticities of 0.27 with respect to working hours and 0.20 with respect
to participation for women in couples while Haan (2003) ﬁnds 0.32 and 0.13 respectively. Our elasticities
are slightly higher probably because we do not account for the joint decision in couples. Indeed, when
husbands’ labor supply is assumed ﬁxed, Haan and Steiner (2004) ﬁnd female elasticities of working hours
very close to ours (0.39); the results also match very well for single women as they ﬁnd elasticities of 0.13.
As in all related studies on Germany, elasticities are found markedly smaller for East German females.
Smaller wage-elasticities for married women in Finland coincide with a higher proportion of women
working full-time in this country. Yet, there are few studies related to labor supply estimations for Finland.
For the year 1987 (before the Finnish recession), Ilmakunnas (1992) considers only working women in
couple and ﬁnds uncompensated wage-elasticities in a range between 0.09 and 0.11. Elasticities found
by Kuismanen (1997) are even smaller. In both cases, it is diﬃcult to compare these results with ours,
as participation eﬀects do not seem to be accounted for. Kuismanen (2000) ﬁnds very small responses
to important changes in the tax system and Laine (2002) provides diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimations of
the impact of the 1996-2001 reforms, ﬁnding very moderate eﬀects. Overall, it seems that labor supply
responsiveness is extremely small in Finland. Larger elasticities for singles than for married women
remain surprising however and require further investigation.
Our approach could fruitfully be compared to the strategy of Spadaro (2004) who acknowledges the
lack of consensus in the literature regarding the size of elasticities and simply postulates diﬀerent levels
of labor supply responsiveness to analyze the impact of tax reforms on social welfare. In the present
paper, we rely more traditionally on the econometric approach despite the well-known limitations (see
the Appendices). This approach enables us to capture discrepancies in labor supply sensitivity across
countries which turn out to be prominent in explaining the diﬀerence in results for an identical tax reform.
Still, an interesting complementary exercise, left for future research, would consists in assuming identical
elasticities across countries in order to capture what relates speciﬁcally to institutional factors (existing
tax-beneﬁt systems, wage/income structures etc.) in explaining cross-country discrepancies in the eﬀects
of each reform. Notice however that the bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals provided in Figures 14 and
15 reveal that the bounds are close enough to perform some sensitivity analysis. In the case of married
women for instance, upper bound of the conﬁdence interval for Germany (resp. Finland) is fairly close
t ot h el o w e rb o u n df o rF r a n c e( r e s p . G e r m a n y ) . A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h eu p p e rl e v e lo fr e s p o n s et ot h e
WTC reform in Germany does not reach the lower level in France, as shall be seen below.
5 Tax reform analysis
5.1 Tax reform analysis without behavioral responses
The ‘ﬁrst-round’ analysis consists simply in assessing the cost and targeting of each reform when no be-
havioral response is taken into account. This is usually done by static microsimulations and in this study,
we make use of the European integrated tax-beneﬁt model EUROMOD described in the Appendices. In
addition, the potential impact of the reforms on hours and participation can be characterized by varia-
tions in the distribution of EMTRs and the ﬁnancial gains to work respectively. The direction of these
variations gives useful intuitive insights to explain the labor supply responses found in the ‘second-round’
23France Germany Finland
WTC (apparent cost) 0,404% 0,356% 0,394%
WTC (net cost) 0,395% 0,289% 0,383%
LWS (cost) 0,571% 0,350% 0,406%
Figure 16: Relative cost of the reform in % of 1998 total GDP (no behavioral responses).
analysis which follows.
5.1.1 Cost and distributional analysis
The static analysis of the WTC is summarized in Figure 17. Figure 16 reveals the relative cost of the
reform as a proportion of the country’s total 1998 GDP, which allows for straightforward cross-country
comparison. It appears that the apparent cost is slightly smaller in Germany (0.36% of GDP) than in
France or Finland (around 0.40% of GDP). In absolute terms, the cost of 5.8 billion EUR in France and
7.6 billion in Germany can be compared to the £5 billion spent in 2001 in the UK on the WFTC (7.3
billion EUR).
As expected in the discussion on framework conditions, the number of recipients is larger in Finland
(10.6% of the households) than in France (10.1%) and in Germany (9%). Results are nevertheless rea-
sonably comparable across countries. The diﬀerence between France and Finland is not as large as could
be expected when looking at participation rates only. As mentioned above, part of the diﬀerence is oﬀset
by the fact that earnings are concentrated in higher ranges of income in Finland, which also explains the
somewhat lower level of the average beneﬁt (39 EUR per week versus 43 in Germany and 49 in France).
Just as in the UK, the reform targets the ﬁrst half of the distribution of equivalent incomes, with the
exception of the ﬁrst decile which is composed mainly of inactive households which are not concerned by
the reform.
The net cost (i.e. total variation in disposable income) is naturally lower than the apparent cost
(total expenditure on the WTC by the government) as the introduction of the WTC partially crowds out
spending on social assistance. For instance, in France, the diﬀerence between apparent (5.86 billion EUR)
and net costs (5.741) is explained for 97% by the subsequent decrease in social assistance (RMI/API).
The diﬀerence is especially large in Germany (around 20%), certainly due to the generosity of the German
minimum income scheme. In fact, the previous budget curve analysis revealed that working 16 hours at
minimum wage in France and in Finland is suﬃcient to exit the segment of income assistance while the
same does not hold for Germany.
The static analysis of the LWS is summarized in Figure 18. As discussed in the review of MWP
policies, the individual LWS reform is by nature less targeted than the family-based WTC. In eﬀect, the
number of recipient households is twice as large as with the WTC; the policy measure attains individuals
in all income deciles as low-wage individuals can be found in richer families.
The parameters of the reform have been calibrated so that post-response costs of both reforms are as
close as possible. As we shall show below, a net decrease in labor supply in France following the WTC
imply a relatively larger post-response cost for this reform, and, hence, for the LWS as well; moreover,
important positive responses to the LWS imply an even larger pre-response cost for the LWS in France.
This mainly explains the important diﬀerences in cost and in the number of people concerned by the
LWS reform.




apparent cost (billion euros/year) 5,859 22,5% 20,3% 2,3% 54,9%
net cost (billion euros/year) 5,741 22,5% 19,9% 2,3% 55,4%
recipients nb of hh 2 316 233 34,3% 16,3% 4,5% 44,9%
% of population 10,1%
net average amount (euros/week) 49 32 60 25 59
net max amount (euros/week) 205 90 194 62 205
Germany
apparent cost (billion euros/year) 7,662 20,9% 23,7% 2,2% 53,2%
net cost (billion euros/year) 6,221 23,9% 21,4% 2,0% 52,8%
recipients nb of hh 3 443 208 31,6% 15,7% 4,2% 48,5%
% of population 9,0%
net average amount (euros/week) 43 28 65 23 47
net max amount (euros/week) 149 90 120 57 149
Finland
apparent cost (billion euros/year) 0,506 41,9% 18,0% 1,3% 38,9%
net cost (billion euros/year) 0,492 42,1% 18,4% 1,1% 38,4%
recipients nb of hh 248 663 53,7% 14,4% 1,7% 30,2%
% of population 10,6%
net average amount (euros/week) 39 31 49 30 50
net max amount (euros/week) 248 90 159 53 248
Source: authors' computations using EUROMOD
Figure 17: Descriptive statistics for the WTC reform
Furthermore, it appears that the impact of the LWS depends on structural factors as discussed previ-
ously. As shown in Figure 13, hourly wages are rather concentrated at the lower end of the distribution
in France and Finland, which explains a relatively larger number of eligible individuals (22.9% of the
households contain at least one eligible individual). Figure 18 presents average amounts per household
(and not per individual); diﬀerences between France and Finland simply result from a much higher total
cost in France for an identical proportion of recipients in both countries. Once again, Germany stands
in between as both total cost and total number of recipients are smaller (due to a more dispersed wage
distribution). Unlike the WTC, the size of the average subsidy is almost constant across household types.
Couples are slightly above the average simply because there can be more than one eligible individual per
couple. Note also that there is no diﬀerence between apparent and net costs as the LWS does not interact
with the rest of the system.
A measure of the targeting of the two reforms is presented in Figure 19: the WTC reform targets
the ﬁrst half of the distribution of equivalent incomes, just as in the UK. Highest gains, moreover,
are concentrated between the second and third income decile, given the higher percentage of inactive
households in the ﬁrst income decile. The LWS reform, on the other hand has a more or less normal
proﬁle: highest gains - in absolute terms - are concentrated in the middle of the distribution, also due
to the possibility of double eligibility in a same household. In the ﬁrst and in the second decile, on the
other hand, the gains tend to be small, due to low participation or shorter working hours. Finally at the
top of the income distribution, higher hourly wages phase out the LWS.




cost (billion euros/year) 8,206 15,4% 6,8% 23,3% 54,4%
recipients nb of hh 5 277 893 17,5% 7,8% 21,3% 53,4%
% of population 22,9%
average amount (euros/week) 30 26 26 33 30
max amount (euros/week) 111
Germany
cost (billion euros/year) 7,476 13,4% 11,0% 28,0% 47,6%
recipients nb of hh 6 334 906 13,6% 11,7% 27,4% 47,4%
% of population 16,6%
average amount (euros/week) 23 22 21 23 23
max amount (euros/week) 81
Finland
cost (billion euros/year) 0,545 20,1% 8,1% 23,9% 47,9%
recipients nb of hh 538 521 23,9% 8,6% 26,1% 41,4%
% of population 22,9%
average amount (euros/week) 19 16 18 18 23
max amount (euros/week) 83
Source: authors' computations using EUROMOD























































































Figure 19: Average amount of transfer per decile (adult equivalent disposable income)
265.1.2 Characterization of potential eﬀects on working hours through EMTRs
The potential impact of both reforms on working hours may be characterized by the variations in the
distribution of EMTRs. With the WTC, EMTRs should increase in the phase-out range as the amount












with dCnew the variation in disposable income when not accounting for the WTC but only for its impact
on other instruments (e.g. on social assistance). Two eﬀects actually come into play. Firstly, the EMTR
increases by the level of the taper rate t = 55%, corrected by the fact that this withdrawal rate applies to
t h ei n c o m ec o n c e p tz (labor income net of tax and social security contributions plus some beneﬁts) rather
than to gross earnings y. This way, for an increment dy homogeneous across countries, the corresponding
variation dz should be smaller in Finland and Germany since taxes and social contributions are higher
in those countries than in France; hence the increase in the EMTR is smaller in both of these countries.
Secondly, the WTC interacts with other instruments and in particular with social assistance so that
dCnew ≥ dC in the phase-out region. Therefore, the increase in EMTRs for WTC recipients in this
region should be equal at most to the taper rate on gross income dz
dyt.
Results conﬁrm this analysis. Figure 20 shows that EMTRs increase substantially for deciles 3, 4 and
5, given the relatively sharp phasing-out of the transfer; the rise is eﬀectively more important in France
where taxation is relatively lower. Finland starts out from a situation of high marginal income tax rates
so that a smaller part of the gross increase of 1500 EUR will be taxed away in the phase-out region. The
same applies to Germany, although the increase in EMTRs starts only at the third decile (the second in
Finland). This is probably related to the greater importance of (ﬂat rate) social security contributions
rather than of progressive income taxation in Germany, so that low earnings are relatively more taxed
than in Finland (hence EMTR rise relatively less at the bottom).
Two reasons explain why EMTRs decrease in the two ﬁrst deciles in Germany. Firstly, the 16 hours
threshold for eligibility may induce negative EMTRs in the cases where the increment makes the household
eligible for the WTC; this is more often the case in Germany due to a larger proportion of households
below the 16 hours threshold. Secondly, the WTC crowds out social assistance for low income household
in activity; this way, the implicitly taxation of additional gross earnings switches from 100% (withdrawal
rates of minimum income schemes) to dz
dyt. Finally, the impact of the reform on the second half of the
distribution is quite insigniﬁcant, so that EMTRs of deciles 6 to 10 hardly change.
Figure 21 complete this analysis. It shows that the proportion of EMTRs in the range 40−60% tend
to decrease while the proportion of very high EMTRs (above 70%) increases from around 4.2t o7 .1%
in Germany and Finland and from 3.8t o1 1 .3% in France. This last result is not fully comparable to
those of Blundell et al. (2000) who ﬁnd the proportion of higher rates to decrease in the UK. This is
mainly due to the fact that the authors confront the introduction of the WFTC to a baseline situation
with an in-work transfer (the Family Credit) already in place. The new reform introduced in the UK
consisted precisely in decreasing the taper rate of the tax credit from 70% (FC) to 55% (WFTC), in
order to modify a situation in which the proportion of EMTRs above 70% was extremely high (14.8%


































Figure 20: Distribution of EMTRs per decile of disposable income per adult equivalent
EMTR
baseline WTC LWS baseline WTC LWS baseline WTC LWS
<0 0,1 0,2 0,5 0,6 0,8 1,2 0,0 0,0 0,0
in [0.0; 0.1] 0,5 0,5 4,9 4,3 4,3 4,7 0,5 0,5 0,5
in [0.1; 0.2] 3,2 3,1 16,4 5,5 5,4 5,5 0,2 0,2 0,8
in [0.2; 0.3] 21,3 20,5 21,2 2,5 2,2 2,9 2,6 2,6 4,3
in [0.3; 0.4] 53,0 44,1 40,6 10,9 10,7 13,0 4,9 4,6 9,9
in [0.4; 0.5] 12,9 10,5 9,3 17,2 15,6 18,2 32,9 28,5 29,1
in [0.5; 0.6] 3,6 3,1 2,1 50,0 44,0 46,1 45,6 43,1 43,4
in [0.6; 0.7] 1,0 3,1 0,8 3,1 3,2 2,9 7,6 7,1 7,0
in [0.7; 0.8] 0,5 3,6 0,7 1,6 6,8 1,5 1,5 6,3 1,1
> 0.8 3,8 11,3 3,5 4,3 7,1 4,1 4,2 7,1 4,0
Source: authors' calculations using EUROMOD
France Germany Finland
Figure 21: Impact of the reforms on the distribution of EMTRs








with K =1i fw/W ≤ α and K ∈ [0,1] if w/W ∈ [α,β]. In this case, dC does not vary after the reform
as the LWS does not interact with the rest of the system. EMTR can only decrease and at most by the
level (in percentage points) of the wage subsidy A.
As seen in Figure 20, the LWS reform shifts EMTRs downwards along the whole income distribution.
The strongest relative reduction occurs between the 2nd and the 4th decile. In a comparative perspective,
note that the magnitude of the reduction is larger in France. This comes as no surprise since the relatively
higher net cost of WTC in France implies a larger amount of wage subsidy.
As mentioned before, the deﬁnition of the EMTR is crucial for the interpretation of the results.
Indeed, if incremental gross income do not correspond to additional hours of work but instead to a pay








if w/W ∈ [α,β]
In this case, EMTRs will increase if w/W > β/2. With the values retained here, this will be the case for
all workers in the range [α,β]. This aspect is ignored in the present study although it is important and
illustrates the fact that the tax burden can also generate ‘productivity traps’.
5.1.3 Characterization of potential eﬀects on participation through ﬁnancial gains of work
Contrary to the EMTR analysis, we study the ﬁnancial gains of work only for the females in the selected
samples (used for labor supply estimations). We simply simulate the relative increase of household
disposable income (in %) when females works full or part-time as compared to remaining inactive. The
wage rate is computed from the data for females in employment, while it is predicted by means traditional
econometric techniques for inactive females. Figures 22 and 23 describe the ﬁnancial gain to take a job
for single and married women respectively.
Larger amounts of transfer through a well targeted WTC naturally lead to a larger increase in ﬁnancial
gains to work for single women. This is particularly striking as regards the gain of working part-time,
which rises from 47 to 79% (resp. 67 to 91% and 56 to 81%) in France (resp. Germany and Finland) after
implementation of the WTC but only to 50% (resp. 70 and 58%) after introduction of the LWS. The
average gain of working full-time increases by 7 percentage points in Finland and by more than 10 points
in Germany and France with the WTC; it increases only by half of this when the LWS is introduced.
Similarly, the proportion of very low gains (less than 40%) decreases substantially when the WTC is
introduced, and this for all three countries.
For married women, however, the picture is completely diﬀerent. First, it is noticeable and expected
that the gain is much smaller than for single individuals; this is especially the case in France and Germany
29baseline WTC LWS baseline WTC LWS baseline WTC LWS
<20% 1,1% 0,5% 0,2% 12,8% 4,9% 10,2% 4,4% 1,7% 2,9%
in [20%; 40%[ 6,5% 1,7% 2,4% 10,4% 8,6% 9,1% 8,9% 4,6% 9,4%
in [40%; 60%[ 11,1% 3,3% 8,3% 9,1% 12,1% 11,5% 9,4% 11,8% 7,9%
in [60%; 80%[ 15,8% 9,2% 12,7% 11,0% 11,5% 9,3% 9,4% 8,4% 9,6%
in [80%; 100%[ 14,0% 23,6% 23,5% 8,6% 10,4% 9,5% 9,6% 10,3% 9,1%
in [100%; 120%[ 10,5% 19,6% 11,5% 6,6% 9,5% 7,7% 7,9% 10,6% 9,4%
in [120%; 140%[ 7,7% 8,3% 8,3% 7,3% 6,4% 7,1% 7,7% 7,2% 7,2%
in [140%; 160%[ 6,6% 6,6% 6,3% 7,3% 7,5% 7,5% 8,4% 8,9% 8,2%
>160% 26,7% 27,3% 26,9% 26,9% 29,1% 28,3% 34,3% 36,5% 36,3%
average gain to work full time 132,4% 143,9% 138,7% 143,0% 153,2% 148,0% 134,9% 142,2% 138,7%
average gain to work part time 47,0% 78,7% 50,1% 67,2% 90,6% 69,7% 56,2% 81,0% 58,2%
Calculations from the authors using EUROMOD
% increase in disposable 
income if she works full-time
France Germany Finland
Figure 22: Impact of the reforms on ﬁnancial gain of work (single women)
% increase in disposable 
income if she works full-time
baseline WTC LWS baseline WTC LWS baseline WTC LWS
<10% 0,0% 0,7% 0,0% 0,5% 2,6% 0,2% 2,5% 0,9% 1,4%
in [10%; 20%[ 2,2% 5,9% 1,7% 5,4% 7,9% 3,0% 1,7% 3,6% 1,9%
in [20%; 30%[ 7,3% 13,4% 5,1% 11,4% 12,7% 10,4% 3,5% 6,3% 3,3%
in [30%; 40%[ 15,1% 17,9% 11,7% 14,6% 14,6% 12,9% 7,8% 10,0% 7,0%
in [40%; 50%[ 18,3% 18,0% 17,1% 17,0% 17,7% 18,6% 13,9% 15,1% 13,5%
in [50%; 60%[ 17,8% 14,8% 19,0% 14,6% 12,9% 16,7% 15,4% 16,6% 15,9%
in [60%; 70%[ 13,8% 12,1% 17,2% 12,4% 10,8% 13,4% 16,3% 14,0% 17,0%
in [70%; 80%[ 9,1% 6,4% 11,5% 7,6% 7,0% 7,8% 13,6% 12,4% 13,7%
>80% 16,4% 10,8% 16,9% 16,5% 13,9% 17,1% 25,4% 21,1% 26,3%
average gain to work full time 57,6% 50,4% 60,1% 57,7% 53,4% 59,5% 65,3% 61,3% 66,3%
average gain to work part time 29,7% 24,5% 31,0% 31,1% 28,6% 32,0% 37,0% 34,6% 37,5%
Calculations from the authors using EUROMOD
Finland Germany France
Figure 23: Impact of the reforms on ﬁnancial gain of work (women in couple)
where the earnings of the second-earner are taxed away at the marginal tax rate of the ﬁrst earner, a
consequence of the joint income taxation system. The same holds for the WTC for which income is jointly
assessed at the household level. As a result, additional earnings by wives may lead to a loss in WTC
entitlement for their working partners. The gain of working full time thus shifts from 58 to 54% (resp. 58
to 53% and 65 to 61%) in France (resp. Germany and Finland). Besides average ﬁgures, the distribution
in Figure 23 reveals that the proportion of small gains associated to working full-time (less than 30%)
will increase drastically in France (from 9.5% to 20% of the selected women) and more moderately in
Germany and Finland (from 17 to 23% and from 7.7t o1 0 .8% respectively). The LWS slightly improves
average gains of working (especially full-time) and reduces the proportion of small gains, especially in
France and Germany.
305.2 Tax reform analysis with behavioral adjustments
We now make use of the labor supply estimates to predict behavioral responses to both reforms. The
strategy to simulate transition matrices and to derive conﬁdence intervals is described in the Appendices.
5.2.1 Labor supply responses
Labor supply responses to the WTC are presented in Figure 24. The intuition from the analysis of
ﬁnancial gains of work are conﬁrmed by the fact that more than 1.5% of single women sample in Germany
and 1.8% in Finland are encouraged to enter the labor market. Even though the size of ﬁnancial gains
was comparable across all countries in Figure 22, results turn out to be much larger in Germany and
Finland than in France due to the following two reasons. Firstly, the pre-reform participation rate
i sc o m p a r a t i v e l ym u c hl o w e ri nG e r m a n yt h a ni nF r a n c ei no u rs e l e c t i o no fs i n g l e s( 7 9v e r s u s9 7 % ) .
Secondly, the participation elasticities are substantially larger, especially in Finland (see Figure 15).
Our previous analysis of the ﬁnancial gain of work revealed a bias towards second-earners, that is, a
gender bias towards the female in couples. The proportion of very small gains derived from full-time work
increases in France particularly, which explains the large number of women (whose partner works and is
eligible to the WTC) which would leave the labor market (4.35% of selected women living in couples). This
proportion is smaller in Germany (2.79%) and Finland (1.34%) mainly because participation elasticities
are lower for married women in both these countries. In all countries, the associated earnings loss is partly
compensated by an increased tax credit on the husband’s earnings while additional utility is drawn from
more leisure (or domestic production, not modelled as such in the present setting).
Overall, the disincentive eﬀect for married women prevails so that the net eﬀect on employment
is negative in all three countries and proportionally larger in France (a net 3.14% proportion of the
population would withdraw from the labor market) than in Germany and Finland (respectively 0.78 and
0.14%). Conﬁdence intervals displayed in Figure 24 are small enough to conﬁrm the robustness of these
results.
Finally, transitions from full- to part-time activity for single women are the consequence of the increase
in EMTRs described previously; this shift is especially important in France (6.17% of selected single
women) as it is the country where EMTRs increase the most.
In the UK, the incentive eﬀect of the WFTC on singles only slightly prevailed over the disincentive
eﬀect on married women with employed partners (see Blundell et al., 2000, and Gregg et al., 1999).
The net eﬀect was too small to draw clear conclusions on the possibility for the WFTC to create work
incentives. British studies conclude that the important amount of money spent on the WFTC could only
be justiﬁed on distributive grounds. It is diﬃcult, though, to compare our results in a straightforward
way with the situation in the UK since the WFTC came simply as a replacement of the previous family
credit. Also, our WTC is extended to childless households. Interestingly enough, our simulations lead to
clear-cut conclusions on the net disincentive eﬀe c to ft h i ss c h e m ei nF r a n c ea n dG e r m a n y .
Labor supply responses to the LWS are presented in Figure 25. We have stated that the ﬁnancial
gain of working full-time increase twice as much with the WTC than with the LWS in the case of single
women. This explains why the positive incentive eﬀects of the LWS on singles’ participation is between
half and two-third of what was found for the WTC reform (18,000 women versus 39,000 women with
the WTC in Germany, for instance).
The LWS increases ﬁnancial incentives to work for married women, in particular by reducing the













in % of the 
selected 
population
France married women 0,03% 4,35% 0,00% 0,07% -4,32% -168 405 -147 794 -187 933 -3,14%
single women 0,51% 0,00% 0,01% 6,17% 0,51% 7 468 4 773 10 109 0,14%
total -160 937 -143 021 -177 824 -3,00%
Germany married women 0,55% 2,79% 0,03% 0,22% -2,24% -89 992 -71 646 -107 122 -1,36%
single women 1,56% 0,06% 0,27% 1,30% 1,50% 38 708 25 040 53 361 0,59%
total -51 284 -46 606 -53 761 -0,78%
Finland married women 0,17% 1,34% 0,00% 0,04% -1,17% -3 846 -3 267 -4 741 -0,77%
single women 1,85% 0,00% 0,00% 0,45% 1,85% 3 159 2 069 4 562 0,63%
total -687 -1 198 -179 -0,14%
All percentages computed as a proportion of the specific sub-group (singles, couples) except the last column where percentages correspond to the whole selected population.
Simulated responses to WTC (%)
Country Type
90% confidence intervals
Figure 24: Response to the WTC reform
extent in Germany explains the positive eﬀects on the participation of married women (3.15% of selected
women living in couple are induced to enter the labor force in France compared to 1.6% in Germany and
only 0.4% in Finland).
Overall, the joint positive eﬀect on single and married women leads to the clear conclusion that the
LWS could signiﬁcantly improve social inclusion by enhancing employment in France and, to a lesser
extent, in Germany. This result validates the choice made in 2001 by the French government to opt for
an individualized policy (see section 2); however, the actual amounts distributed through the Prime pour
l’emploi are much smaller than the individual subsidy suggested here and should have hardly any eﬀect
on employment (see Bargain, 2004b).
5.2.2 Cost of the reforms and targeting
Figure 26 details the cost and targeting of each reform before and after behavioral responses. First of all,
it should be noted that the net cost after labor supply responses is almost identical for both reforms in





y the total gross labor income produced in a country, then the eﬀective net tax levied by
the government on households is T =
P
(y−C). The real cost of a reform is then −∆T =
P
(∆C −∆y),
that is, larger than the simple variation in disposable income when the reform implies net disincentive
eﬀects (∆y<0). This is exactly what happens with the WTC; as negative responses are larger in France,
Figure 26 shows that the real cost increases dramatically for this country once responses are accounted
for (from 5.7u pt o7 .9 billion EUR). The inverse occurs in the case of an incentive reform so that the real
cost of the LWS is smaller than the pre-response cost (7.9v e r s u s8 .3 billion EUR in France for instance).
By the same token, the net average transfer of WTC increases after responses while the average amount
of LWS decreases. In both cases, the number of recipients increases, whether responses are positive (the













in % of the 
selected 
population
France married women 3,15% 0,05% 0,52% 0,01% 3,10% 120 704 106 540 135 977 2,25%
single women 0,33% 0,00% 0,64% 0,00% 0,33% 4 865 3 013 6 787 0,09%
total 125 569 109 553 142 764 2,34%
Germany married women 1,60% 0,04% 0,27% 0,02% 1,55% 62 422 50 479 76 516 0,95%
single women 0,70% 0,00% 0,13% 0,00% 0,70% 18 055 11 824 24 643 0,27%
total 80 477 62 303 101 159 1,22%
Finland married women 0,41% 0,07% 0,02% 0,01% 0,34% 1 115 862 1 329 0,22%
single women 1,17% 0,00% 0,01% 0,00% 1,17% 2 004 1 406 2 746 0,40%
total 3 119 2 268 4 075 0,62%
All percentages computed as a proportion of the specific sub-group (singles, couples) except the last column where percentages correspond to the whole selected population.
Simulated responses to the LWS (%)
Country Type
90% confidence intervals
Figure 25: Response to the LWS reform
may lead the husband to become eligible); we shift from 9 to 9.5% of households eligible to the WTC in
Germany and from 22.8t o2 3 .2% of households eligible to the LWS in France, for instance.49
5.2.3 Distributive impacts
We now tackle the distributive objective, namely the reduction of poverty. We assess the number of
households taken out of poverty, holding the pre-reform poverty line constant and considering poverty
lines deﬁned as 40, 50 and 60% of the median of equivalent disposable income.50
Figure 27 shows that both the WTC and the LWS achieve signiﬁcant poverty reduction in France as
the poverty rate declines from 7.03% to 6.38% with the WTC and to 6.48% with the LWS, at the 50%
poverty line. Surprisingly, the WTC succeeds only slightly better than the wage subsidy. In Germany,
the reduction is not as large and the eﬀects of both reforms are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. In Finland,
49Evidently, when labor supply responses are added to the picture, the number of recipients increases by less than the
number of ‘movers’. Indeed, part of the movers were already entitled to the beneﬁt before the transition. In Germany, this
is the case for 23% (resp. 21%) of the movers due to the LWS (resp. WTC). These ﬁgures are respectively 44 and 32% in
France and 15 and 12.5% in Finland.
50Estimated poverty rates for France are in line with results reported in Mantovani and Sutherland (2001) and derived
from 1997 French ﬁscal data, according to which poverty rates are 2.4%, 6.9% and 12.8% with a poverty line at 40%, 50% and
60% respectively. Finland’s poverty rates are however not so close to Mantovani and Sutherland (2001) who this time use
ﬁgures derived from the 1999 Income Distribution Survey (2%, 4% and 9%, respectively). The diﬀerence in equivalence scale
explains only part of the gap. More important is probably the role of the 100% take-up rate assumed by the microsimulation
software, especially with respect to the discrepancies at the very bottom of the distribution. The diﬀerences are somewhat
larger in Germany, for which Grabka (2001) reports the following poverty rates using 1999 GSOEP: 4.5%, 8.2% and 13.6%.
Is is however well known that take-up of Sozialhilfe is particularly low. The full take-up hypothesis notwithstanding, the
pattern of poverty rates quite closely matches statistics derived from non simulated data. Moreover, the few discrepancies
encountered are not so relevant to the present analysis, given that we are more interested in the relative movements in and
out of poverty under both reforms, than in the absolute level of headcount ratios.
33Working Tax Credit
net cost billion euros/year 5,74 6,22 0,49
real cost including behav. resp. billion euros/year 7,90 7,17 0,52
nb of recipient (hh) % of population 10,1% 9,0% 10,6%
nb after response idem 11,2% 9,5% 10,7%
net average amount per hh (euros/ month) 207 151 165
net average amount after response idem 256 165 172
Low-wage subsidy
net cost billion euros/year 8,30 7,52 0,52
real cost including behav. resp. billion euros/year 7,92 7,25 0,52
nb of recipient hh % of population 22,8% 16,3% 21,9%
nb after response idem 23,2% 16,5% 22,0%
average amount per hh (euros/ month) 132 101 84
net average amount after response idem 124 96 83
Source: authors' computations using EUROMOD.
France Germany Finland
Figure 26: Cost of the reforms (behavioral responses included)
the reduction is even smaller than in Germany, except if the 60% poverty line is considered, which means
that the reforms redistribute relatively more to the ‘richest’ among the poor households. This last aspect
is true to some extent in all the countries so that poverty reduction becomes smaller as we consider lower
poverty lines (the 40% line captures the poorest households which are composed to a higher proportion
of inactive households, that is, households that do not beneﬁt from the reforms).
A central question to our study is whether increased labor participation is itself responsible for impor-
tant moves across the poverty line. Positive labor supply responses of single women (in the case of the
WTC) and married women (with the LWS) indeed enhance poverty reduction to some extent. Yet, they
do not dramatically change the picture in France or Finland. Things are markedly diﬀerent in Germany.
It turns out that in this country, the number of households taken out of poverty by the WTC is almost
doubled (resp. tripled) by behavioral responses when the 50% (resp. 40%) poverty line is considered.
This result can be explained by the combination of two facts: poor households are most often single indi-
viduals and the increase in single women’s participation is particularly high when the WTC is introduced
in the German system (see Figure 24).51
5.2.4 Cost eﬃciency
Finally, we study the cost eﬃciency of the reforms to achieve either incentive or distributive objectives.
For this purpose, we simply compute the cost per woman taking up work (when the net employment
eﬀect is positive) and the cost per household taken out of poverty. Results are presented in Figure 28.
In relative terms, the real (post-response) cost of both reforms corresponds to 0.54% of GDP in France,
0.33% in Germany and 0.40% in Finland. In Finland, the labor supply responses and distributive eﬀects
of both reforms are much smaller than in France and Germany, which leads to extremely high eﬃciency
costs, whether social inclusion or poverty reduction are considered.
51The proportion of single adult adultst amongst the poor population is around 70% in France and Germany when the








median equivalized income (EUR/month) 1 222 1 225 1 220 1 254 1 259
poverty rate - line at 60% of the median 14,00% 12,29% 12,26% 12,78% 12,69%
variation in the number of poor hh -393 110 -12,2% -400 185 -12,4% -279 016 -8,7% -301 044 -9,3%
poverty rate - line at 50% of the median 7,03% 6,38% 6,35% 6,48% 6,45%
variation in the number of poor hh -150 121 -9,3% -156 105 -9,7% -127 528 -7,9% -134 508 -8,3%
poverty rate - line at 40% of the median 2,22% 2,07% 2,07% 2,05% 2,05%
variation in the number of poor hh -33 506 -6,6% -33 506 -6,6% -37 437 -7,3% -37 437 -7,3%
Germany
median equivalized income (EUR/month) 1 246 1 249 1 247 1 260 1 262
poverty rate - line at 60% of the median 11,18% 10,69% 10,55% 10,86% 10,81%
variation in the number of poor hh -183 836 -4,3% -238 490 -5,6% -119 245 -2,8% -139 119 -3,3%
poverty rate - line at 50% of the median 5,65% 5,51% 5,41% 5,52% 5,50%
variation in the number of poor hh -54 654 -2,5% -94 402 -4,4% -49 685 -2,3% -59 622 -2,8%
poverty rate - line at 40% of the median 2,10% 2,07% 2,02% 2,08% 2,07%
variation in the number of poor hh -9 937 -1,2% -29 811 -3,7% -4 969 -0,6% -9 937 -1,2%
Finland
median equivalized income (EUR/month) 1 090 1 124 1 124 1 105 1 106
poverty rate - line at 60% of the median 11,97% 11,59% 11,54% 11,44% 11,39%
variation in the number of poor hh -8 966 -3,2% -10 286 -3,6% -12 670 -4,5% -13 787 -4,9%
poverty rate - line at 50% of the median 3,75% 3,72% 3,71% 3,67% 3,66%
variation in the number of poor hh -583 -0,7% -826 -0,9% -1 882 -2,1% -2 118 -2,4%
poverty rate - line at 40% of the median 0,76% 0,76% 0,76% 0,75% 0,75%
variation in the number of poor hh 0 0 -445 -2,5% -445 -2,5%
Note: poverty line kept fixed at the baseline value
Figure 27: Distributive eﬀets of the reforms
35Working Tax Credit
Nb of households out of poverty due to the reform 150 121 54 654 583
in % of total population 0,65% 0,14% 0,02%
Nb of households out of poverty due to behav. resp. 5 984 39 748 242
in % of total population 0,03% 0,10% 0,01%
Nb of households back to work -160 937 -51 284 -687
in % of total population -0,70% -0,13% -0,03%
Cost per household out of poverty (EUR/year) 52 638 131 230 888 575
Low-wage subsidy
Nb of households out of poverty due to the reform 127 528 49 685 1 882
in % of total population 0,55% 0,13% 0,08%
Nb of households out of poverty due to behav. resp. 6 980 9 937 235
in % of total population 0,03% 0,03% 0,01%
Nb of households back to work 125 569 80 477 3 119
in % of total population 0,55% 0,21% 0,13%
Cost per household out of poverty (EUR/year) 62 143 145 902 276 239
Cost per household back to work (EUR/year) 63 112 90 077 166 690
Note: poverty line at 50% of the median
France Germany Finland
Figure 28: Cost eﬃency in achieving social inclusion or poverty reduction
Eﬃciency costs are very high in the two other countries as well and markedly higher in Germany. It
would cost 63,000 EUR in France and 90,000 EUR in Germany to bring a woman back to work through
the LWS reform and respectively 53,000 and 131,000 EUR to take a woman out of poverty by means
of the WTC. Note that the cost to bring a single woman back to work using the WTC reform would be
180,000 EUR in Germany and considerably higher in France. If poverty reduction is the central policy
objective, then the WTC is preferable. However, the cost per household out of poverty is only slightly
larger with the LWS which also provides net positive eﬀects on employment.
According to Pearson (2002), the cost per net job created has ranged between 30,000 and 100,000$
in the past MWP experiences in the UK and the US. Our results for the LWS are very similar. Both
reforms suggested here are relatively expensive (as is the WFTC in the UK) but fortunately, the cost is
not the only criterion by which these policies must be judged. Still, the question of funding these reforms
- highly problematic in the present European budgetary context - remains.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper, we present an extended analysis of ‘making work pay’ policies in Finland, France and
Germany, three countries which suﬀer from particularly large potential inactivity traps due to generous
social assistance. More speciﬁcally, we introduce two types of employment-conditional payments in the
three countries under consideration. The ﬁrst instrument is a working tax credit in the fashion of the
British WFTC and the second is a simple wage subsidy. These two reforms illustrate the typical opposition
between family-based instruments and individual transfers, which characterizes recent trends in ‘making
work pay’ policies in OECD countries. In particular, the former type of instrument is conditioned on
household income and is known to yield disincentive eﬀects for women whose partner is employed.
This study is one of the very ﬁrst cross-country analyses of tax-beneﬁt reforms conducted in a truly
comparative and comprehensive way. Firstly, female labor supply estimations are carried out using
36datasets that are rendered homogeneous across countries. Secondly, tax analysis is performed using the
integrated microsimulation of European tax-beneﬁt systems EUROMOD. Thirdly, the microsimulation
is combined to structural discrete-choice models in order to predict potential behavioral responses to the
reforms. Estimations make use of a similar speciﬁcation across country to compare the determinants of
labor supply and predict diﬀerences in labor supply responsiveness to exogenous changes on the budget
constraints. Fourthly, the individual wage subsidy is calibrated to reach the same cost basis as the
tax credit, once behavioral responses are accounted for. Lastly, diﬀerences in ‘framework conditions’
across countries are emphasized throughout the analysis, notably the diﬀerences in income and wage
rate distributions and the way tax-beneﬁt reforms interact with national systems in force. These issues
turn out to be crucial to explain the diﬀerences in the eﬀects of each reform across countries. They are
important issues to be dealt with when designing tax-beneﬁt reforms aimed at reshaping work incentives
at national level.
We ﬁnd that the overall female employment decreases after the introduction of the working tax credit.
The participation of married women decline in all three countries and especially in France, where labor
supply is slightly more elastic. This is only partially oﬀset by a positive eﬀect on single women’s labor
supply in Germany and Finland. With the individual transfer, married women are clearly encouraged
to take up a job, especially in France. The total positive eﬀect on female labor supply remains small
however.
As a result, neither poverty reduction nor social inclusion seem achievable through ‘making work pay’
policies in Finland, the main culprit being very low labor supply elasticities. Policy intervention aimed at
enhancing employment should attempt to levy on the demand-side by reducing the cost of low-productive
work for employers. However, such a policy should be recommended only if demand-side elasticities are
large enough; B¨ ockerman and J¨ antti (2004) conﬁrm the importance of demand-side aspects. As a matter
of fact, the Finnish authorities are currently considering possible reductions in employer social security
contributions for low-wage jobs.
For Germany and France, ﬁnal comments on the design of in-work transfers and on the treatment
of the family dimension depend necessarily on policy objectives. We have deﬁned the social inclusion
objective as the number of female workers encouraged to enter the labor market. In this respect, the wage
subsidy performs unambiguously better. Yet, it is noticeable that a large proportion of poor households
(around 70% in France and Germany) are single individuals. Interestingly enough, a substantial number
of poor single women are induced to work by the working tax credit in Germany. As a result, this reform
cannot be rejected if indeed social inclusion now means encouraging employment of the poorest, even at
the price of creating disincentives for second-earners in couples. Such deﬁnition of social inclusion also
implies positive externalities not accounted for here, as described by Phelps (2000).52 Moreover, these
results justify the need for measures better targeted to sub-groups of the population.
Both the family-based tax credit and the individual wage subsidy achieve signiﬁcant poverty reduction
in France, less so in Germany. Surprisingly, the tax credit performs only slightly better than the wage
subsidy. To echo the previous argument relative to the social inclusion of the poorest households, note
that increased participation of poor single women induced by the tax credit contributes substantially to
poverty reduction in Germany; once accounting for this eﬀect, the gap between the performances of the
two reforms increases. Naturally, the poverty criterion is only one among several distributional aspects;
52Phelps argues that there are potentially important social and economic externalities associated with entering the labor
market (he insists on the fact to hold a full-time job): “Bringing marginalized groups, including those who work in the
underground economy, into mainstream economic activities may generate beneﬁcial outcomes for society as a whole, for
example through the amelioration of problems like crime, social destitution, drug etc.”
37it must not be forgotten that the working tax credit achieves an important transfer to the ﬁrst-half of
the income distribution, with the exception of the very ﬁrst decile, in all three countries.53
Ultimately, the ranking of policy objectives depends on social preferences, unfortunately unknown.
Following Spadaro (2004), we could draw conclusions for a broad range of values measuring social aversion
towards inequality and ﬁnd out the range over which one reform is socially preferred to the other. This
type of analysis implies additional assumptions and in particular interpersonal utility comparisons; this
extension is kept for future research. More pragmatically, we have focused on policy criteria often retained
by decision-makers and which ground the debates on the reform of European welfare systems.
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Appendices
Data and sample selection
Finnish data are provided by the Income Distribution Survey, which contains a combination of register
data and information gathered through interviews by Statistics Finland. The dataset refers to 1998 and
contains detailed socioeconomic information for 25,010 individuals living in 9,345 households. German
data come from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) initiated by the German Institute for Eco-
nomic Research (DIW) in 1984. Unlike Finland, the data are collected yearly through interviews only.
The 1998 dataset contains information on 18,772 individuals living in 7,677 households. The data used
for France are taken from the French Household Budget Survey 1994 collected by INSEE; monetary vari-
ables have been grossed up to 1998, assuming demography constant. No structural change has occurred
in the tax-beneﬁt system between 1994 and 1998 so that there is no inconsistency between the simulated
system (1998) and observed behaviors (see Bargain and Terraz, 2003). The sample contains information
on 28,973 individuals living in 11,220 households. All three datasets ha v eb e e nw e i g h t e dt ob er e p r e s e n -
tative of the whole population and rendered homogeneous in the framework of the EUROMOD project,
including similar variables deﬁnitions (see Sutherland, 2001).
For each country, we select a sample of married and cohabiting couples and a sample of single women.
In each case, we keep only households where adults are aged between 25 and 64 and available for the
labor market. For this purpose, households where adults are disabled, student or retired are excluded.
42Women Men Women Men Women Men
Participation* 70,5% 99,1% 63,2% 95,7% 73,6% 90,1%
Working time (hours/week) / participants 35,7 42,0 33,3 38,2 37,0 40,0
Working time (hours/week) / all 26,0 41,9 21,6 36,7 35,5 39,8
Gross wage rate (euros/hour) / participants 10,5 12,8 12,2 15,8 11,8 15,5
Gross wage rate (euros/hour) / all** 9,9 12,8 11,8 15,8 11,4 15,3
Average age 38,2 40,4 38,4 40,9 40,2 41,8
Primary education 30,7% 17,9% 14,6% 11,1% 16,1% 18,6%
Vocational training 37,9% 46,0% 48,7% 44,8% 35,2% 37,8%
High school diploma 14,8% 17,9% 23,2% 25,9% 27,5% 18,1%
University studies 16,7% 18,2% 8,5% 14,9% 21,2% 25,4%
Average number of children
Presence of child 0-2
Presence of child 3-5
Presence of child 6-11
Nb of selected households
Corresponding population
% of total population
* non-participation according to our discretization (i.e working less than 15 hours per week or than 6 months per year)





















Figure 29: Descriptive statistics for couples
So are households of self-employed or farmers (and civil servants, for France). The labor supply behavior
of these two categories (and civil servants in the case of France, whose job is guaranteed for life) may
indeed be rather diﬀerent from salary workers and would require a diﬀerent modeling strategy altogether.
Moreover, independent workers are subject to income tax rules which are substantially diﬀerent from the
ones applied to salary income and which require additional information not available here. Households
where adults are unemployed are taken out of the selection. This corresponds to a pure supply-side
strategy in which we focus on non-rationed workers.54
Employees not reporting important pieces of information (e.g. worked hours) are excluded from each
sample. To further increase data homogeneity, extreme households are selected out, notably the ones
receiving important levels of non-labor income, the ones with more than 3 children or whose children earn
substantial earnings (more than half the cumulated earnings of the parents). Households with more than
two decision-makers in the case of couples (i.e. other adults than the basic couple) are also withdrawn
from the sample.
Descriptive statistics of the selected samples are presented in ﬁgures 29 and 30 for couples and singles
respectively. Wage rates are not provided directly and must be computed as earnings divided by the
number of work hours. Wage rates for non-working women are predicted using the usual Heckman (1979)
two-stage estimation technique.55
The distribution of working hours for the selected samples is represented in Figures 31 and 32. A
usual feature in continental Europe, mostly driven by demand-side and institutional constraint, is that
the pattern of hours appears fairly rigid as it presents concentration around a limited number of hours
54Withdrawing unemployed individuals enables to discard job seekers but also leads to exclude discouraged workers.
Reliable information to identify job seekers would be necessary for a more comprehensive approach.
55Because the labor supply models are nonlinear, it is necessary to take the wage rate prediction errors explicitely into
account for a consistent estimation of the models, for instance by integrating the disturbance term of the wage equation
in the likelihood. Practically, this is done by approximating the integral by a simulated mean. However, for a tractable
number of draws (20), this correction did not signiﬁcantly change our results.
43France Germany Finland
Participation* 96,8% 79,3% 80,1%
Working time (hours/week) / participants 37,4 36,0 37,7
Working time (hours/week) / all 36,6 28,7 36,7
Gross wage rate (euros/hour) / participants 11,2 12,4 12,5
Gross wage rate (euros/hour) / all** 11,1 12,8 11,8
Average age 40,6 38,5 42,5
Primary education 22,3% 21,0% 17,6%
Vocational training 32,7% 44,6% 36,1%
High school diploma 15,1% 22,5% 26,2%
University studies 30,0% 11,9% 20,2%
Average number of children 0,64 0,59 0,54
Presence of child 0-2 2,3% 4,9% 1,9%
Presence of child 3-5 4,8% 6,2% 5,3%
Presence of child 6-11 14,5% 19,2% 12,0%
Nb of selected households 664 453 416
Corresponding population 1 458 464 2 579 207 171 100
% of total population 6,3% 6,8% 7,3%
* non-participation according to our discretization (i.e working less than 15 hours per week or than 6 months per year)
** these include predicted wages
Figure 30: Descriptive statistics for single women
choices in all three countries. In that case, the discrete approach retained here seems particularly well
suited (see Van Soest, 1995).56
Structural model of labor supply and tax-beneﬁt simulation
Model and speciﬁcation
Labor supply modeling in this paper relies on a discrete choice multinomial/conditional logit model and
on a traditional speciﬁcation in terms of consumption-leisure preferences. If household i is oﬀered to
choose one among J work durations for the female adult, it is assumed that the utility the household
may derive from alternative j (= 1,..J)i sg i v e nb y :
Vij = U(Hj,C ij,Z i)+²ij, (1)
where U() is a conventional utility function which depends on female work duration (Hj) and consumption
(Cij) as well as on a vector Zi of household characteristics. Women are assumed to choose between
nonparticipating (H1 =0 ) ,p a r t - t i m e( H2 = 20 hours/week) and full-time (H3 =3 9h o u r sp e rw e e k ) .
The actual utility derived from alternative j for household i, Vij, also includes an error term ²ij that
is assumed to be identically and independently distributed across alternatives and households according
to a type I-extreme value distribution.57 Under this distributional assumption, McFadden (1973) proves
56The distribution of male hours - available upon request - is much more concentrated, quasi-exclusively around full time.
57The assumption of independence across alternatives results in the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA). This shortcoming can be avoided by introducing random terms accounting for unobserved heterogeneity across
households (see McFadden and Train, 2000). With the random parameter model, however, the computation of bootstrapped
conﬁdence intervals becomes computationally non-tractable, as proved by Haan (2004). In addition, the latter shows that
the results in terms of wage elasticities from a conditional logit do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the results of a random
parameter logit. We obtain the same results for the three models presented here and decide to rely on the conditional logit


















































































Figure 32: Distribution of working time (single women)
45that the probability that alternative k is chosen by household i is given by:
Pik =P r ( Vik ≥ Vij,∀j =1 ,..J)=
expU(Hk,C ik,Z i)
PJ
j=1 expU(Hj,C ij,Z i)
.
The likelihood of a sample of observed choices can be derived from that expression as a function of the
preference parameters of function U(). Estimates of these parameters may be obtained by maximum
likelihood techniques. As in Blundell et al. (2000), we choose a quadratic functional form so that, for
choice j =1 ,...J, the deterministic part of the utility is written as follows:
Uij = αccC2
ij + αhhHj














h). Observed heterogeneity in vector Zi corresponds to
socio-demographic characteristics supposed to pick up variation in tastes for work across households.
In order to comply with the usual properties required for well-behaved preferences, some regularity
constraints are usually added to the preceding framework. In particular, C-monotonicity and quasi-
concavity seem natural minimum requirements for positive and normative analysis of tax reforms. Positive
monotonicity is written:
2αccCij + αchHj + αcir > 0.
Practically, we impose this constraint in the likelihood maximization. Quasiconcavity is most often
relaxed and simply checked a posteriori in related studies, thus avoiding the critique of MaCurdy (1992)
that elasticities are largely determined ap r i o r i . It turns out here that C-quasiconcavity is always fulﬁlled
when C-monotonicity is imposed.
Budget constraint and microsimulation
In the present static framework, consumption is equivalent to disposable income:
Cij = D(wiHj,y i,Z i).
Disposable income is expressed as a function D(), the arguments of which are some socio-demographic
characteristics of the household as well as gross incomes. In our setting, endogenous income wiHj in
alternative j corresponds to labor income of a single or of a wife (in couples), with wi the wage rate
of the person considered. Exogenous income yi includes non-labor income, such as capital income, and
the earnings of the husband (in couples). As a result, D() represents the way the tax-beneﬁts y s t e m
transforms gross income into disposable income. In general, this function relies on a fairly complex set
of tax-beneﬁt rules computed by microsimulation.
In the present paper, disposable income at each discrete hours choice is computed using EUROMOD
microsimulation. EUROMOD is a tax and beneﬁt calculator based on homogeneous micro-data on
income, earnings, labor force participation as well as socio-demographic variables gathered for the member
countries of the European Union. For each country and for the year 1998, this microsimulation model
enables us to compute all social contributions, direct taxes and transfers to individuals and households
and thus to calculate household disposable income, replacement rates and eﬀective marginal tax rates.
An introduction to the model and a descriptive analysis of European systems are provided by Immervoll
and O’Donoghue (2001) and Sutherland (2001).
46Variable
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
income² -21.9498 4.9144 *** -2.9260 10.2510 -26.4957 7.4651 ***
female hours² 4.8128 .2949 ***  2.3065 .3673 *** 9.1652 .5443 ***
female hours x income 1.1945 1.2855 -1.0002 2.5060 1.5839 2.0792
income -41.5824 11.7884 *** 20.9454 17.1296 -23.1057 12.2757 **
x female age/40 38.8598 16.7766 *** 57.4418  34.1371 * 69.7468 24.2224 ***
x (female age/40) ² ns ns -28.3773  15.2769 * -29.1119 11.8734 **
x male age/40 28.2235 16.9983 * -32.8948 7.6808 *** ns ns
x # children 0-2 18.5153 4.5939 *** ns ns ns ns
x # children 3-5 9.9980 3.7059 *** ns ns ns ns
x # children 6-11 9.1716 2.5094 *** ns ns ns ns
x 1(region)@ 7.0700 1.3903 *** -12.8571 5.0395 *** 4.8992 1.1943 ***
female hours  5.8904 1.3858 *** -2.0258 .6589 *** -8.8773 .6208 ***
x female age/40 -7.0596 1.8309 *** ns ns ns ns
x male age/40 -4.0039 1.8388 ** ns ns ns ns
x # children 0-2 -3.0707 .5071 *** -3.3672 .3387 *** -2.2393 .1862 ***
x # children 3-5 -1.910  .4131 *** -3.0676 .2867 *** -.1810 .1434
x # children 6-11 -1.6500 .2768 *** -1.7954 .1541 *** -.1919 .1044 *
x 1(region)@ ns ns 3.4062 .5510 *** ns ns
x 1(married) -.2747 .1865 ns ns .3246 .1533 **
Log-Likelihood
Nb of observations
Level of significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
@ : the dummy `region' corresponds to Paris area for France, Helsinki area for Finland and East Germany for Germany.








Figure 33: Estimation results for women in couple
Results of estimations
As we use the same labor supply methodology and homogenous datasets with the same deﬁnitions of
variables, it is possible to provide a reliable picture of the diﬀerences and similarities in labor supply
behaviors in France, Germany and Finland. Callan, Dex, Smith and Vlasblom (1999) provide similar
cross-country comparisons for Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Germany.
Figure 33 presents the results of the estimations for women in couples. Among estimated taste
parameters for income, only the regional dummy and female age are signiﬁcant in all three countries. On
the contrary, estimates for hours are more often signiﬁcant. As could have been expected, the marginal
utility of work decreases with the presence of children, and especially very young children. Women prefer
to work signiﬁcantly more if located in East Germany (positive coeﬃcient of the regional dummy), which
is a usual result. Marginal utility of work decreases with age in France, suggesting a move towards single-
earner couples as the household ages (or a cohort eﬀect). In Finland, it turns out that women signiﬁcantly
prefer to work more when married.
Figure 34 presents the results of the estimations for single women. Among estimated taste parameters
for income, only female age is signiﬁcant in all countries. On the contrary, estimates for hours are more
often signiﬁcant in France and Germany. The marginal utility of work decreases with the presence of
children between 0 and 2 in all three countries; the coeﬃcients for older children are not always signiﬁcant
however, except in Germany where the disutility of work decreases with the age of the children (which
may also reﬂect decreasing childcare costs as the children get older and go to school). Again, women
prefer to work signiﬁcantly more when living in East Germany and less when they grow older (in France
and Germany).
47Variable
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
income² -54.3544 23.8996 *** -164.9638 41.3225 *** -70.8054 49.3646
female hours² .0654 .8786 3.6165 .8382 *** 13.8404 1.8541 ***
female hours x income 17.8010 8.7094 ** 8.1466 7.9430 ** 1.5776 8.1891
income -62.1622 39.3672 -43.1169 44.1962 -138.4106 29.3103 ***
x female age/40 119.1399 68.7225 * 186.6772 84.6024 * 296.542 57.3874 ***
x (female age/40) ² -48.3022 30.5138 -90.5340 37.7626 ** -130.1408 26.7441 ***
x # children -3.1994 2.7546 -8.0673 3.5386 *** ns ns
x 1(region)@ 8.1489 5.0149 * ns ns 4.2375 3.4476
female hours 3.8634 1.8444 ** -2.1754 1.5461 -13.1094 1.9158 ***
x female age/40 -2.0915 1.4830 -2.4791 1.2203 ** ns ns
x (female age/40) ² ns ns ns ns ns ns
x # children 0-2 -1.5024 .6778 ** -5.3494 1.2623 *** -2.1548 1.1239 **
x # children 3-5 -.8967 .6006 -3.7813 .7819 *** -.2899 .4100
x # children 6-11 -1.3529 .3853 *** -1.1990 .3345 *** ns ns
x 1(region)@ ns ns 1.5097 .4983 *** ns ns
Log-Likelihood
Nb of observations
Level of significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
@ : the dummy `region' corresponds to Paris area for France, Helsinki area for Finland and East Germany for Germany.








Figure 34: Estimation results for single women
Note that quasiconcavity in H is not respected as coeﬃcients of H2 are always positive. This could
be due to the fact that hours variables not only represent distaste for work but also account for variable
costs of work.58 Dynamic aspects or demand-side rationing can also be captured in the estimates and
interfere with the purely static and labor supply interpretations.
Goodness-of-ﬁt
Goodness-of-ﬁt (in terms of the pseudo-R2 in nonlinear types of models as the one used) and accurate
predictions are usually a matter of trade-oﬀ. To increase the number of variables in Zi for a better ﬁt
would indeed lead to fairly less precise predictions of labor supply elasticities or responses to the reforms.
T h ec o m p r o m i s ew em a d e-m o s t l yi n ﬂuenced by the necessity to obtain precise predictions - was to take
out of the speciﬁcation all interacting socio-demographic characteristics whose coeﬃcient were highly
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The pseudo-R2 or Likelihood Ratio Index of McFadden (1974) is a measure (ranging between 0 and
1) of the distance between the maximized value of the log-likelihood and the log-likelihood when all
parameters are set to zero. This indicator is helpful for the speciﬁcation search as it summarizes the ﬁt
of a given speciﬁcation in a single value; however, the absolute value is itself not very informative (see
Green, 2000) and it cannot be used to rank the quality of estimations across countries.
A usual approach to measure goodness-of-ﬁt in a multinomial setting is to compare for all discrete
choices their observed frequency by the average estimated value over all households. For couples and
58The usual practice consists in adding state-speciﬁc dummies (or only part-time dummies, as in Van Soest, 1995) which
could represent the variable costs of work (e.g. childcare costs) or the speciﬁc disutilities from job search (e.g. when part-
time jobs are relatively scarse, in the Dutch case studied by Van Soest, 1995). We tried such speciﬁcation but it turned






















0 0,296 0,300 18,6% 0,368 0,368 39,0% 0,264 0,284 25,5%
20 0,117 0,114 0,6% 0,166 0,166 2,7% 0,038 0,041 0,1%
39 0,588 0,586 18,2% 0,466 0,466 34,6% 0,698 0,675 23,5%
pseudo-R2 26,5% 30,4% 42,2%
choice
France Germany Finland





















0 0,032 0,032 6,7% 0,208 0,208 43,2% 0,200 0,215 16,8%
20 0,117 0,113 2,7% 0,093 0,093 4,1% 0,019 0,012 0,1%
39 0,851 0,855 7,0% 0,700 0,700 37,5% 0,781 0,773 16,2%
pseudo-R2 58,8% 48,2% 53,4%
choice
France Germany Finland
Figure 36: Goodness-of-ﬁt for estimations on single women
singles respectively, ﬁgures 35 and 36 show that the probabilities predicted for all countries correctly
represent the proportions of the samples. The ﬁgures also display the generalized R2 for each choice,
that is, the percentage of observed variance explained by the model. Results seem reasonable except for
the prediction of part-time work. This is in line with ﬁndings from the recent literature (Laroque and
Salani´ e, 2002, for France; Bonin, Kempe and Schneider, 2003, for Germany).
Simulating transitions
To compute transition frequencies after a shock in the budget constraint (reform, increase in wage rates
to compute elasticities, etc), the following strategy was retained. We generate a plausible baseline (or
pre-reform situation) by repetitively drawing some series of pseudo-residuals b ²ij (j =1 ,...J)f r o mat y p e
I-extreme value distribution for the stochastic part of the utility at each hour choice, until a perfect match
between observed and predicted hours is obtained. Post-reform optimal choices are deﬁned as the hours
predicted by the deterministic model plus the retained pseudo-residuals b ²ij derived from the calibration
step. The procedure is repeated 100 times to obtain transitions frequencies for each household. Transition
tables result from averaging over the whole population.
As the nonlinearity of the model makes sensitivity analysis fairly complex, we proceed numerically.
Conﬁdence intervals for each transition cell and summary measure are simulated by drawing 100 times
from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the parameter estimates, and for each of those 100 param-
eter draws, applying the method described above to build transition matrices.
Limitations of the approach
It is worth noting that the assumption that male labor supply is ﬁxed can bias the estimations for
women in couple. Indeed, beyond usual eﬀects in second-earner models, female labor supply may be
linked to some extent to the labor supply of husbands by some matching of unobservable characteristics
49between spouses. For instance, women with inactive husbands tend to work less than women with
working partners, ceteris paribus (i.e for the same level of cumulated male and non-labor incomes). This
heterogeneity cannot be identiﬁed with the few household characteristics available. In particular, it is
diﬃcult to know if the matching between spouses is related to preferences, to the productivity of both.
This bias is partly reduced here by the fact that the husband’s wage rate (or 0 if inactive) is introduced in
the estimation used to predict wage rates for female non-workers. A better correction of this bias would
require to predict wage rates for all women and not only for inactive ones.
Other important limitations of this setting are worth mentioning even though common to most related
studies in the literature. Firstly, some labor market constraints are not addressed in the present study
and in particular rationing in the choice of hours. Information on actual as well as desired hours of
work is necessary to capture these aspects and to disentangle supply and demand sides. The necessary
data is unfortunately not provided by the datasets at hand.59 Secondly, we implicitly assumed that
before-tax hourly wage rates do not vary with work hours.60 Thirdly, prices/wages are assumed not to
change with the reforms. Our results can be seen as valid in the middle-term, the short-term implying no
behavioral responses (ﬁrst-round analysis) and the long-run incorporating general equilibrium eﬀects.61
In addition, it is assumed that employers will not oﬀset the net gain of the beneﬁtb yl o w e r i n gh o u r l y
wages.62 Fourthly, the model is static and does not account for life cycle aspects which could justify that
some households take a job even when ﬁnancial gains are null.
Other aspects are worth mentioning. We focus here on ﬁnancial incentives only and ignore the type
of institutional arrangements chosen as a framework to implement the reform, even though those may
be determinant to the eﬀectiveness of the policies. The administrative arrangement for the payment of
the transfers may be important and in particular the frequency of payment.63 T h ef o r mc h o s e nf o rt h e
MWP policies also has a non negligible role. Three forms of employment-conditional transfers are usually
used by governments: wage subsidies, in-work beneﬁts or refundable/non-wastable tax credits. In our
simulations, the form given to each policy - purely illustrative - has been simply pragmatic. An individual
policy in the form of a tax credit - as in the recent Belgian reform - would require individualized income
tax schemes which is not the case in France or Germany. To keep the implementation in all three countries
as simple as possible, a wage subsidy seemed a natural candidate. As for the family-based reform, we
have used the popular British reform as a benchmark, and have hence chosen a refundable tax credit
i n s t e a do fa ni n - w o r kb e n e ﬁt.64 This is also motivated by the fact that in-work beneﬁts conditional on
59Even when desired hours are available, it is diﬃcult to make sure that individuals’ answers to the preferred hours question
only reﬂect preferences (and are not themselves aﬀe c t e db ys o m ec o n s t r a i n t s ) .D e s i r e dh o u r sa r eu s e di nI l m a k u n n a sa n d
Pudney (1990), Van Soest et al. (1990), Callan and Van Soest (1996), Euwals and Van Soest (1999) and Van Soest and
Das (2000).
60This hypothesis is relaxed in Moﬃt (1984), Tummers and Woittiez (1991) and Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990). The
authors ﬁnd that before-tax wage rates are lower for part-time jobs. In the countries we examine, most wages are determined
by collective bargaining within branches or sectors so that discrimination between full-time and part-time workers is less
likely to occur.
61Using a CGE model for Germany, Boeters et al. (2003) ﬁnd that general equilibrium eﬀects are rather modest when
simulating MWP policies (a cut in social assistance and a reduction in marginal tax rates). Partial equilibrium approxi-
mations are justiﬁed insofar as only a small number of individuals are aﬀected, which is usually the case with this type of
reforms.
62To limit this adverse eﬀect, minimum wage legislation has recently been implemented in the UK.
63See comments from Duncan (2000) an Dilnot and McCrae (1999).
64Note that this choice may well have implications as far as intrahousehold aspects are concerned. Indeed, in the
beginning the Family Credit was payable to the main carer of the children (most often the wife), but the WFTC was paid
as a refundable tax credit included in the pay package of the main earner (most often the husband). If we accept that who
controls resources matters for intrafamily distribution, the latter reform should be seen as a ‘purse to wallet’ transfer to
50claims have posed serious take-up problems. In the recent years, policy makers have rather opted for tax
credit administered by ﬁscal authorities and paid directly through the wage packet in Paid As Your Earn
systems. Notice that as in Blundell et al. (2000), we have assumed full take-up of both transfers.
families. This issue is addressed in Blundell, Myck and Lechene (2002) using the methodology developed in Laisney (2002,
ed.) to simulate a collective model of labor supply. It is interesting to note that the 2003 reform in the UK precisely split
the credit in two, a child tax credit going to the main carer and a working tax credit to the main earner.
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